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This thesis consists of three original research articles relating to schooling in England. The 
first research chapter evaluates a recent English education policy which encourages state 
primary schools to become academies: state-funded, non-selective, and highly autonomous 
establishments. The chapter investigates the causal effect of converting to an academy on 
assessment outcomes, and on entry-year intake composition. Unlike existing evidence 
focused on academies formed from failing secondary schools, no evidence is found of a 
converter academy effect on attainment for the average pupil. There is no evidence that 
becoming a converter academy affects the composition of the entry-year intake. 
Standardised tests are a common, yet contentious, feature of many countries’ schools. In 
April 2010, two UK teachers’ unions boycotted mandatory age eleven standardised tests. 
The second research chapter uses a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effect 
of preparing for, but ultimately not completing, standardised tests on subsequent measures 
of attainment. The chapter finds evidence of a statistically significant adverse effect on age 
14 teacher assessed attainment and age 16 secondary school qualification attainment. 
However, substantial treatment effect heterogeneity exists between sub-groups of pupils. 
Potential mechanisms are discussed, particularly the role of target setting. 
Standardised tests often facilitate school accountability, and pupils usually receive grades 
(or other feedback) based on their performance. However, providing feedback is not 
necessary for school accountability. The third research chapter evaluates the effect of 
receiving integer grades based on a series of low-stakes standardised tests taken by eleven-
year-olds in England. The chapter uses raw test marks, typically unobserved by pupils, and 
grade thresholds to implement a sharp regression discontinuity design. The results indicate 
that just passing the cut-off to achieve a higher grade in these tests leads to an improvement 
in secondary school qualification attainment. The estimated effect of just crossing a grade 
cut-off on secondary school attainment is typically larger for economically disadvantaged 
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When an individual invests in acquiring additional education, they will on average 
experience a tranche of positive returns. For example, the economics of education 
literature is awash with evidence of plausibly causal positive earnings returns to human 
capital accumulation (Angrist and Keueger, 1991; Devereux and Hart, 2010; Harmon 
and Walker, 1995). More recently, the literature has turned its attention towards non-
pecuniary returns. Researchers have claimed that additional education causes 
individuals to live healthier lives (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Powdthavee, 2010; Silles, 
2009), have greater old-age cognitive ability (Banks and Mazzonna, 2012), and have 
higher life satisfaction (Oreopoulos, 2007). More education also diminishes the risk that 
a person engages in criminal activity (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Machin et al., 2011) 
and increases the likelihood that they vote (Dee, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004). 
In addition to these private returns, there is abundant evidence of external returns to 
human capital accumulation. That is, other members of society benefit when one 
member acquires additional education. Parents’ education has a positive causal 
influence on the future educational attainment of their children (Björklund et al., 2006; 
Holmlund et al., 2011). Meanwhile, economists have studied the positive association 
between average levels of education in workplaces and cities and an individual’s 
earnings independent of the individual’s level of education (Moretti, 2004a, 2004b; 
Rauch, 1993).  
In developed economies, the public sector takes a central role in the provision of 
education. The existence of external returns to education combined with the non-
existence of perfect credit markets means that the private sector would provide a sub-
optimal level of education provision. Social norms of fairness and an aspiration for 
equality of opportunity also justify the public provision of education, particularly in the 
presence of intergenerational correlations in educational attainment. 
3 
 
In England during January 2018, 21,996 state-funded establishments educated 8 million 
pupils, equivalent to 93 per cent of the population of pupils in England (Department for 
Education, 2018). For the 2016-17 financial year, public sector expenditure on 
education functions in the United Kingdom was £87.2 billion which equates to 11.3 per 
cent of total public sector spending and 4.5 per cent of UK GDP (HM Treasury, 2017). 
Education is the third largest category of public sector expenditure after social 
protection and health. For the same financial year, the Department for Education 
estimated that the core budget for schools in England is worth £5,439 per pupil per 
school year (National Audit Office, 2016). 
Given the sizable cost to society – taxpayers mainly – of providing education as well as 
the sizable social returns to educating the population, it is essential that schools, and 
other education establishments, are both effective and efficient. At best, ineffective 
schooling is an inefficient use of tax revenues. At worst, ineffective schooling 
represents a lost opportunity to enhance the future life course of the failed school 
children and the affected community more broadly. 
For these reasons, there is rightly a great deal of interest in the performance of 
educational institutions and the wisdom of public education policy. Since attainment at 
school strongly correlates with future education participation (Bradley and Lenton, 
2007) and attainment, interest in education policy is generally keenest when pre-schools 
and schools are concerned. This thesis presents three empirical investigations into the 
effects of recent schooling policies in England on the educational attainment of pupils. 
The research provides new evidence to policymakers on the impacts of features of 
English schooling institutions on the pupils these institutions seek to serve.  
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Chapter two presents new evidence on the effectiveness of adopting academy school 
status in the context of primary education (covering pupils between the ages of four and 
eleven). Academy schools are state-funded, non-selective state schools which are highly 
autonomous compared to other state schools and mostly independent of local education 
authorities. The academy school programme was initially an intervention strategy for 
secondary schools with a history of underperformance. However, the flagship schooling 
policy of the 2010-2015 government was the extension of the opportunity to become an 
academy – and thus the chance to enjoy greater autonomy – to all “well-performing” 
schools. As primary and secondary schools opted to become academies, head teachers 
and governors instigated the most substantial reorganisation of the English state school 
sector since the transition to comprehensive schooling.  
The chapter uses a difference in differences strategy to estimate the causal effect of 
becoming an academy school on the attainment of primary school pupils. The research 
design exploits variation in when schools decide to become academies to use early 
converters as the treatment group and later converters as a control group. Using 
administrative data from the National Pupil Database (NPD), the analysis finds that 
when primary schools elect to become academies, there is neither a positive nor a 
negative impact on pupil attainment. Pupil attainment is measured by performance on 
standardised tests completed at the end of primary school and teacher assessments 
administered midway through primary school. This is in stark contrast to the existing 
evidence on academies which shows that academy status does improve attainment when 
applied to underperforming secondary schools. Given the significant costs involved in 
converting schools into academies, the chapter’s findings suggest this is not a wise use 
of taxpayers’ money. Further analysis also finds no evidence that the composition of 
the entry-year intake changes when a primary school becomes an academy. 
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While the effectiveness of academies is one of the more recent debates in English 
education policy, undoubtedly one of the longest-running and most contentious is that 
of the effectiveness of standardised testing. Since the mid-1990s the attainment of 
school children in English state schools has been evaluated in various subjects at critical 
stages of the schooling system. The results of these tests serve a dual purpose, primarily 
they offer a metric to evaluate school performance, but they are also used to provide 
feedback on pupil attainment. Proponents of standardised testing argue that test-based 
accountability incentivises schools to maximise their performance while simultaneously 
allowing regulators and parents to identify poorly performing schools.  
However, critics link standardised tests to numerous adverse consequences. For 
example, there are concerns that standardised testing incentivises teachers to sacrifice 
broad curriculums and enjoyable teaching practices in favour of a narrowed focus on 
testable content and repetitive teaching activities designed to maximise test skills. 
Chapter three explores whether there is a private attainment return or penalty to 
participation in standardised tests. Specifically, the chapter investigates whether 
participation in standardised tests at the age of eleven (the end of primary school) 
causally impacts contemporaneous and subsequent teacher assessments and secondary 
school qualification attainment.  
This is possible due to a widespread head teacher-led boycott of standardised tests that 
occurred in 2010. The first stage of the analysis involves using propensity score 
matching to identify schools that did not participate in the boycott but are similar to 
boycotting schools in other observable dimensions. The analysis’ second stage involves 
estimating difference in differences models based on a panel of pupil level NPD data.  
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The models reveal evidence that participation in the boycott had a small adverse effect 
on the average pupil’s attainment. However, the boycott participation effect varies 
significantly between different subgroups of pupils. The chapter speculates as to the 
mechanisms, focusing mainly on the role of attainment targets imposed by the 
government.  The chapter also reports evidence that the boycott caused pupils to: change 
their subject choices at the end of secondary school, and be absent for slightly fewer 
secondary school lessons. 
Chapter four evaluates the effect of providing pupils with feedback on their 
performance on the same series of standardised tests. The primary function of these tests 
is to produce a measure of school performance for school accountability. Neither pupils, 
parents nor teachers need to know how well each pupil has performed on the tests to 
achieve this central function. Feedback is provided based on the assumption that it is 
harmless and useful. Feedback takes the form of discrete numerical grades ranging from 
2 to 5. These grades are inextricably mapped to national standards of expected 
attainment: level 4 denotes meeting the expected standard, level 5 denotes surpassing 
the expected standard and levels 2 and 3 denotes attainment below the expected 
standard. The testing authority awards grades based on pupils’ raw test marks. Because 
pupils and parents generally only know the level that has been awarded and not the raw 
test mark achieved, pupils who perform near identically on the standardised tests can 
receive markedly different feedback on their attainment.  
For example, consider two identical pupils. One scores 70 marks on the standardised 
maths test, the other scores one mark less. This could be due to a variety of trivial 
reasons. Perhaps the second pupil misread one question or made a minor arithmetic 
error. Maybe the pupils’ tests were marked by different examiners who slightly differed 
in their method of awarding marks. If the threshold to achieve a level 5 grade is 70 
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marks, then the first pupil is told that their performance surpasses the national standard, 
whereas the second pupil is told that their performance meets the national standard. 
Neither pupil knows how “close” they were to receiving the other pupil’s grade. 
As data is available on the raw test marks achieved by pupils as well as the grade 
thresholds, a regression discontinuity design can be used to uncover the effect of 
narrowly crossing the raw mark threshold for specific grades on the standardised tests. 
The analysis finds evidence that ‘just’ passing the raw mark threshold for the level 4 
and level 5 grades has a slight positive impact on attainment in secondary school 
qualifications; the effect estimates are more substantial for pupils with a history of free 
school meal eligibility. The effect of English test grades on FSM ineligible pupils is 
precisely zero. Whereas for FSM eligible pupils, the effect estimates are statistically 
different from zero at the one per cent significance level. The chapter suggests that it is 
an undesirable feature of a schooling system that feedback on supposedly low-stakes 
standardised tests effects subsequent high-stakes secondary school qualification 
attainment. The chapter further contends that it is not desirable that the polarising effect 
of the test feedback be more pronounced for the most economically disadvantaged 
group of pupils. Further analysis finds no evidence of an effect on pupil effort as 
measured by school attendance during the school year after the standardised test.  
Chapter Two: 
Does Greater Primary School Autonomy Improve 
Pupil Attainment? Evidence from Primary School 
Converter Academies in England 
A recent English education policy has been to encourage state primary schools to 
become academies: state-funded, non-selective, and highly autonomous establishments. 
Primary schools have been able to opt-in to academy status since 2010 and academies 
now account for twenty-one per cent of the primary sector. This chapter investigates the 
causal effect of becoming a converter academy on primary school assessment outcomes, 
and on entry-year intake composition. Unlike existing evidence focused on earlier 
academies formed from failing secondary schools, no evidence is found of a converter 
academy effect on attainment for the average pupil. Although, there is evidence of a 
slight positive effect on age eleven attainment for pupils eligible for free school meals. 





The relentless growth in the number of academies represents arguably the most 
significant transformation of the English state school sector since the introduction of 
comprehensive schools in the mid-1960s. First introduced in the early 2000s, academies 
are state-funded, non-selective, yet highly autonomous schools operating mainly 
without local authority interference. Since the change in the UK government in 2010, 
the Department for Education (DfE) has overseen a process of “mass academisation” 
whereby all state schools have been encouraged to become academies. 65 per cent of 
secondary and twenty-one per cent of primary schools are now academies. 
Some studies suggest that the high priority attached to the mass academisation 
programme is justified. The conversion of existing secondary schools between 1988 
and 1997 into foundation schools, which enjoyed greater autonomy than their 
predecessors, was estimated to increase the proportion of pupils passing five GCSEs or 
more by five percentage points on average (Clark, 2009). A second intervention, the 
sponsored academies programme, established 200 sponsored academies between 2002 
and 2010 to replace historically underperforming schools. Research suggests that the 
replacement of these schools with academies led to an improvement in pupils’ GCSE 
attainment (Eyles et al., 2018). Pupils attending these academies were also more likely 
to complete a degree following their schooling (Eyles et al., 2016b). These two 
interventions were different and affected schools with dissimilar performance records, 
but both increased schools’ autonomy and the affected pupils’ attainment. 
The existing body of research into academies focuses overwhelmingly on secondary 
sponsored academies established before 2010. Sponsored academies are far less 
prevalent than converter academies, the latter of which are formed by schools that 
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voluntarily elect to become academies. These schools tend to be already well-
performing and educate relatively advantaged pupils. Researchers have only recently 
turned their attention towards converter academies. For example, Eyles et al. (2017) 
and Worth (2015) both show that attainment in primary converter academies does not 
improve following academy conversion.  
This chapter uses a difference-in-differences strategy to exploit the availability of data 
before and after conversions to identify the effect of becoming a converter academy on 
pupil attainment in primary schools. This chapter also considers whether voluntary 
academy conversion alters the composition of the primary schools’ entry-year intake. 
This chapter finds no evidence that the average pupil performs any better in reading or 
maths tests at the end of primary school because their school became a converter 
academy. However, evidence is uncovered that one sub-group of pupils, those eligible 
for free school meals (FSM), perform slightly better in age eleven maths and reading 
tests. There is also a small positive effect on age eleven reading attainment for schools 
that had the least autonomy before becoming a converter academy, but no effect is found 
for schools that were already relatively autonomous before conversion. No evidence is 
found that average pupil attainment at age seven is affected by converter academy 
status. Lastly, the composition of the entry-year intake does not appear to change with 
respect to several observable pupil characteristics following conversion. 
This chapter informs a lively public debate over the merits of academies, which are 
opposed by most teacher unions, some local authorities and major opposition political 
parties. The debate was galvanised by the 2016 government white paper Education 
Excellence Everywhere which declared the DfE’s aspiration for every English state 
school to become an academy (or be in the process of doing so) by 2020 (Department 
11 
 
for Education, 2016).1 While full academisation is no longer a policy priority, schools 
continue to become academies at a vast rate. The scale and speed of the reform are 
unprecedented. If the trend continues then, state-funded schools will be mostly 
independent of local government, and the English state schooling system will secure its 
position as the world’s most decentralised. 
Academies are relatively less prevalent in the primary sector than the secondary sector. 
Furthermore, the government has already ensured that many of the worst performing 
primary schools have become sponsored academies. As such, the most significant 
consequence of further academisation will be a substantial increase in the number of 
primary converter academies – the specific type of academy studied in this chapter.   
The conversion process is known to place significant administrative and financial 
burdens on the DfE, local authorities and schools themselves. For example, the DfE 
incurred additional costs of £1bn due to the academies programme between April 2010 
and April 2012 (National Audit Office, 2012). This includes one-off costs such as the 
£25,000 grant paid to schools to facilitate the conversion process, as well as the 
additional recurrent cost per open academy. In 2012/13, this was estimated at £260,000 
per annum on average. At a time when the English state school sector is facing resource 
pressures, such as teacher shortages, and expecting other radical reforms, such as the 
introduction of a national school funding formula, this timely analysis is unable to 
provide evidence of any benefit from academy conversion to the average primary school 
pupil. 
                                                 
1 The white paper stated that schools would be forced to become academies by 2022 even if this was 
against schools’ wishes. A hostile backlash led to a policy revision whereby state schools would be 
encouraged but not compelled to become academies by 2022. 
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2.2 Institutional background 
There are two broad types of state school in England: maintained schools and 
academies. Maintained schools receive funding and some professional and pupil-facing 
services from local education authorities (LEAs), to whom the government has 
historically delegated schooling provision. These authorities also set, or constrain, the 
policies and processes of their maintained schools; although the degree of control LEAs 
have over schools varies between different types of maintained school. The types of 
maintained school are, from least to most autonomous: community, voluntary-
controlled, voluntary-aided and foundation schools. Academies, on the other hand, are 
funded directly by the DfE and are mostly independent of LEAs. 
Academies recruit and contract their staff, unlike community and voluntary-controlled 
schools whose staff are employed by their LEAs. Academies may impose their own 
employment terms and can disregard nationally negotiated teacher pay and conditions. 
They also have considerable freedom in devising their curriculum which must be “broad 
and balanced” and include English, maths, science and religious studies (Department 
for Education, 2010). However, they do not have to follow the national curriculum in 
these subjects, unlike maintained schools who are bound to the full national curriculum. 
Academies set their admission policy unlike community and voluntary-controlled 
schools which are subject to an LEA admission policy.2  
Maintained schools are run by a board of between 9 and 20 governors. In community 
schools, one-fifth of the governors are appointed by the LEA. In foundation, voluntary-
aided and voluntary-controlled schools, a separate charitable (often faith-based) 
foundation appoints between one-quarter and a majority of the governors, reducing the 
                                                 
2 However, admission policies must comply with the national School Admissions Code which forbids 
selection by ability. 
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LEA’s control. Academies are governed by private charitable trusts independent of the 
LEA. These trusts set their own budget and policies, including the length of the school 
day and year. Academies are effectively the UK equivalent of charter schools in the 
USA. 
Officially academies should not be funded advantageously relative to maintained 
schools. However, a 2012 National Audit Office survey of converter academy head 
teachers found that 77 per cent of academies converted to obtain more funding for front-
line education (National Audit Office, 2012). Academies and maintained schools 
receive comparable Dedicated Schools Grant (DSG) funding which covers mainstream 
education provision and is the primary source of funding for schools. However, there 
has been a historical disparity between academies and maintained schools in respect of 
funding for auxiliary functions. LEAs centrally provide some services to maintained 
schools that academies need to procure independently. Academies formerly received an 
additional grant to provide these functions.3  It boosted some academies’ budgets by 
more than 10 per cent and was widely considered to overcompensate academies. This 
grant has now been replaced with the Educational Services Grant (ESG), paid on a 
common per-pupil rate. Since the 2015/16 school year academies and maintained 
schools are financed on a comparable basis (Department for Education, 2014). 
An understanding of the academy sector’s expansion is vital as academies can be 
grouped into two very different subcategories. By 2000 it was apparent to the then 
Labour government that there was a pervasive problem of under-performance, poor 
behaviour and low aspirations in inner-city secondary schools. The government’s 
solution was to inject innovative management and private sector best practices into 
                                                 
3 The grant was known as the Local Authority Central Spend Equivalent Grant. 
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these failing schools. The government set about matching selected schools to sponsors 
– an individual, business or charitable organisation – who would influence the 
management, ethos, and curriculum of the school as it re-opened as an academy. These 
original academies would often occupy new or extensively refurbished facilities co-
financed by the sponsor.4 Between 2002 and 2010, 203 such academies were 
established; all were secondary schools, and most were former maintained schools.5 
Academies founded due to the DfE imposing academy status on failing schools are now 
referred to as sponsored academies. 
The composition of the academy sector changed dramatically following the formation 
of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010. The new 
Secretary of State for Education was keen to offer academy freedoms to schools that 
were not failing or located within inner-city or deprived neighbourhoods. In July, the 
Academies Act 2010 became one of the fastest pieces of education legislation to be 
adopted by the UK parliament. It gave all schools the option to voluntarily become 
academies from the 2010/11 school year, ultimately leading to the first primary 
academies. Academies formed from schools which voluntarily chose to become 
academies are known as converter academies. 
Schools rated “outstanding” by OFSTED, the national school inspections body, 
originally had their applications pre-approved meaning they could become academies 
from September 2010. From April 2011, all applications from “well-performing” 
schools received priority from the DfE.6 The application process is relatively swift, with 
                                                 
4 This requirement was subsequently dropped to encourage more sponsors. 
5 Some academies were new establishments with no predecessor school, some were previously private 
schools. 
6 According to National Audit Office (2012), “well performing” is based on the last three years’ test/exam 
results; prior OFSTED inspections, particularly OFSTED judgements on leadership and the capacity to 
improve; financial management, and any other evidence deemed significant. 
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eight months elapsing on average between an initial expression of interest and the actual 
re-opening of a school as an academy. The approval rate for applications to become a 
primary converter academy is 90 per cent, which should allay fears that schools are 
“cherry picked” to become academies.7 It is not uncommon for conversions to take 
place mid-school year, although many conversions occur over the summer school break.  
The DfE continues to identify under-performing schools, match them with sponsors and 
impose academy status. Weak schools that apply to become converter academies can 
have their application withdrawn and face a sponsor-led academy takeover thrust upon 
them. 
Table 2.1 shows the number of each type of state primary school open at the start of 
every school year since 2008. Five years after their introduction, converter academies 
account for 11.1 per cent of the primary school sector. 5.4 per cent of primary schools 
are now sponsored academies. Table 2.2 depicts the number of primary conversions 
during each school year by predecessor school type. Around 120 primary schools 
converted during the 2010/11 school year. Since then between 350 and 450 conversions 
have taken place each school year. Although a slightly disproportionate number of early 
converters were community schools, it appears that the overall predecessor school type 
distribution corresponds to the prevalence of each type in the pre-academy period. 
In England, pupils start primary school at the age of four or five and complete seven 
school years at primary level before joining a secondary school at age ten or eleven. 
Primary school is split into three stages: reception which lasts a single school year; key 
stage 1 (KS1) which covers the second and third years of primary school (known as 
                                                 
7 This statistic is calculated from the author’s own analysis of the DfE’s Open Academies and 
Applications Dec ’15 dataset, and refers to the number of all applications received by the end of December 
2015 to be approved. 
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year 1 and 2), and key stage 2 (KS2) which encompasses the final four years of primary 
schooling. 
At the end of both key stages, schools assess the attainment of their pupils in English, 
maths and science. Schools have good reasons to encourage their pupils to perform well 
in the KS2 tests. KS2 assessment performance is an integral component of school league 
tables and the broader school accountability system. KS2 performance can also affect 
pupils’ secondary school experience if their secondary school tracks students by ability 
since KS2 performance may be used by secondary schools to gauge the ability of pupils 
joining from primary schools. 
2.3 Literature review 
2.3.1 US evidence: charter schools 
Other nations have introduced new, more autonomous school types to improve 
attainment. A well-established literature exists on charter schools, which were 
introduced to the US in 1992. Like academies, charter schools are highly autonomous, 
fee-free and non-selective. Unlike academies, charter schools tend to be new 
establishments with no predecessor state school. 
The causal effect of charter school attendance is often identified using charter admission 
lotteries to instrument the number of years spent in a charter school.  Identification 
depends on the lotteries being fair and, by implication, lottery winners and losers not 
being systematically different. Angrist et al. (2010) find that lottery winners test scores 
are 0.35σ and 0.12σ higher per year of charter attendance in maths and English 
Language Arts (ELA) tests, respectively. σ denotes the standard deviation of the test 
score distribution for a given subject, grade and year. Based on different samples, 
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Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011) and Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2011) report quantitatively 
similar effects for maths test scores, but find ELA test score effects in limited 
circumstances only. 
There are good reasons to interpret these results cautiously. Admission lotteries are held 
when schools are oversubscribed which is a consequence of good performance. 
Therefore, the studies pre-condition on school quality. These studies also condition on 
schools retaining lottery records which might be associated with the efficiency or 
competence of the school (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011a). The interaction of these factors 
means that the samples of the studies above are small. The sample of eight schools in 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011) is the largest of the three. Hoxby and Murarka (2009) use 
a larger sample of 42 charter schools located across New York City. They report a much 
smaller per year of charter school attendance effect of 0.09σ on maths test scores and a 
statistically insignificant reading test score effect. 
Other lottery based (Gleason et al., 2010) and matching evidence (CREDO, 2013) 
suggests some charter schools are ineffective. Urban charter schools seem to be 
effective whereas non-urban charters appear to be ineffective or harmful. Angrist et al. 
(2013) argue that student demographic differences explain a small portion of the 
urban/non-urban distinction; whereas variation in the policies and practices of urban 
and non-urban charter schools have more explanatory power. The No Excuses 
philosophy, incorporating strict discipline, academic rigour and high expectations, may 
be driving the urban charter school effect (Angrist et al., 2011). 45 per cent of the 
variation in charter school effectiveness is associated with policies aligned with the No 
Excuses model (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011b). 
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Evidence on the medium-term effect of charter school attendance is similarly mixed. 
Teen pregnancy and incarceration are less likely among charter attendees (Dobbie and 
Fryer, 2015), yet charter attendance does not appear to affect the likelihood of high 
school graduation or college enrollment (Angrist et al., 2016). 
State to charter school conversions, which are more comparable to England’s 
experience with academy schools, have also been studied. However, charter school 
takeovers are considerably less common than start-up charter schools. Abdulkadiroǧlu 
et al. (2016) focuses on nine charter takeovers of failing New Orleans, LA public 
schools, and another in Boston, MA. To accommodate selection into and out of takeover 
schools, the authors use enrolment in the schools pre-takeover to instrument enrolment 
post-takeover. Takeovers are shown to have significant positive effects on maths and 
reading test scores. A similar study by Fryer Jr (2014) imposes the freedom and 
practices associated with effective charter schools on eight randomly selected failing 
elementary schools in Houston, TX. After two years of exposure, maths test scores in 
the treated schools improve by 0.15σ on average relative to their closest matched school 
from the control group. 
Another difference between academies and charter schools is that charter schools are 
not generally part of a centralised admissions system. They instead require parents to 
make a separate application to them whereas, academy admissions are handled through 
the same centralised process as applications to maintained schools. Abdulkadiroǧlu et 
al. (2015) investigates charter school effectiveness in the Denver, CO school district 
which has a rare unified, centralised admission system incorporating charter schools. 
The authors find positive attainment effects from charter school attendance similar to 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011). 
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2.3.2 English literature: grant-maintained and academy schools 
The academies programme is not the first initiative to increase the autonomy of 
England’s schools. Between 1988 and 1997, if maintained schools won a majority vote 
of current parents, they could partially opt out of LEA control by becoming a grant-
maintained (GM) school.8 One-third of secondary schools held such a vote. Clark 
(2009) uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the GM conversion 
effect. GM conversion meant greater autonomy, including control over staffing and 
admission policies, and more generous capital and current expenditure funding 
(according to estimates). Clark reports that the percentage of pupils in converters 
passing five GCSEs or more increased by 4 to 6 percentage points (from a base of 60 
per cent). The prior attainment of the entry year intake increased for converters, and 
they experienced higher teacher turnover and a net rise in teacher numbers. No evidence 
is found that schools neighbouring a GM converter were affected by their neighbour’s 
conversion. 
The majority of research into academies is based on the first generation of sponsored 
academies. An early, government commissioned, evaluation of the academies 
programme reported that improvements in the GCSE attainment of the first 27 
academies exceeded the national average improvement (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). However, this finding may merely reflect mean reversion. These academies 
replaced some of England’s most poorly performing schools and had greater scope for 
improvement than the average school. A more rigorous early analysis is provided by 
Machin and Wilson (2009) who compare each academy to a closest matched non-
academy twin and also to other secondary schools in the same local authority. They 
                                                 
8 GM schools are the predecessors to today’s foundation schools. 
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report positive academy effects on GCSE performance. However, their estimates are 
not statistically significant at standard levels. 
A series of papers estimate difference-in-differences models using a treatment group of 
approximately 100 sponsored academies which opened between 2001/02 and 2008/09. 
The control group consists of a further 100 sponsored academies which re-opened in 
later school years. Using school-level data, Machin and Vernoit (2011) find that average 
GCSE attainment and prior (KS2) attainment of the entry-year intake both increase 
following an academy takeover. However, these effects take time to materialise. The 
authors also present evidence that the KS2 attainment of nearby schools’ entry-year 
intake decreases, although schools neighbouring the best performing sponsored 
academies also experience an improvement in their average GCSE performance. 
The estimated GCSE attainment effect for sponsored academies could be biased from 
pupils non-randomly switching into or away from academies in response to sponsored 
academy takeovers. Indeed, the increase in the prior attainment of the entry-year intake 
suggests this is a valid concern. Using the same sample of schools, but with pupil level 
data, Eyles and Machin (2018) account for this potential source of bias by instrumenting 
attendance at an academy with attendance at the academy’s predecessor school before 
the takeover.9 The authors report that the GCSE point score of pupils who attend an 
academy for one school year is 0.04σ higher on average; while for those attending an 
academy for four school years the average effect is 0.24σ.10 Only seven per cent of 
pupils in the sample attend university. However, each school year spent in a sponsored 
academy increases the likelihood of attendance by 0.7 percentage points.  
                                                 
9 For similar analysis see (Eyles et al., 2016a). 
10 Eyles and Machin (2018) suggest that the improvement in GCSE performance is only experienced by 
sponsored academies which takeover former community schools. 
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The authors provide a brief insight into the potential mechanisms behind these 
attainment effects. Sponsored academies are much more likely to undergo a leadership 
change than control group schools. Academies also add extra pupils and teachers, 
including unqualified teachers (one of their new freedoms). The teacher-pupil ratio 
slightly increases. 
There are also improvements in the average prior KS2 attainment of the entry-year 
intake for newer secondary sponsored academies (takeovers after the Academies Act 
2010); the magnitude of the effect is comparable to that for older academies (Eyles et 
al., 2015). The same paper finds no evidence of a change in the prior attainment of the 
entry-year intake of secondary converter academies. 
A National Audit Office (2010) evaluation suggests that sponsored academies improve 
other student outcomes. Sponsored academies are more effective at reducing the 
percentage of school days lost to absence than comparable maintained schools. 
Additionally, they are more effective than similar non-academies at reducing the 
number of their pupils not in education employment or training (NEET) after age 16. 
A fundamental challenge with evaluating sponsored academies is disentangling the 
effects of increased school autonomy, changes in school leadership and heavily 
refurbished or newly built school buildings. It is not clear how these factors interact to 
produce a “sponsored academy effect”. By comparison converter academies generally 
experience an increase in the first of these factors, but no change in the latter two. 
To date, there are two evaluations of converter primary academies. Worth (2015) uses 
propensity score matching to compare KS2 performance in the 2014/15 school year 
between primary converter academies and matched non-academies. The analysis does 
not uncover any statistically significant academy status effect on KS2 performance for 
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the average pupil or several sub-groups of pupils. Since this study is cross-sectional, the 
author is unable to control for any time-invariant differences between academies and 
non-academies. 
Eyles et al. (2017) applies the methodology of Eyles and Machin (2018) to an analysis 
of primary converters. The authors find no effect of voluntary academy conversion on 
KS2 attainment. Primary schools that converted between 2010/11 and 2014/15 form the 
treatment group, while schools that converted in 2015/16 and 2016/17 are the control 
group. However, the approval criteria for academy conversion applications weakened 
significantly in April 2011. In the methodology section (Table 2.4), I show that in the 
pre-treatment period of the present study, primary schools converting between 2010 and 
2012 had a better attainment record and educated more advantaged pupils than primary 
schools that became converter academies after 2012. If these observable differences are 
accompanied by unobservable differences between primary schools established either 
side of the approval criteria change, then enrolment in a predecessor school is not a 
validly excluded instrument for enrolment in a converter academy. To address this, 
Eyles et al. stratify their sample according to schools’ most recent OFSTED rating. This 
ensures there are no differences in the means of baseline characteristics between their 
control and treatment schools. 
An aspect of the academy programme yet to be thoroughly analysed is academy chains. 
Half of all academies are a constituent of one of nearly 300 chains: academies linked 
together through a common sponsor and/or as a single legal entity (typically, a multi-
academy trust). The development of chains has been encouraged to mitigate the risks 
associated with increased autonomy and to facilitate the sharing of best practice. 
Focusing on long-established chains, (Hutchings et al., 2014) offers a descriptive 
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analysis of the effectiveness of chains in the secondary sector.11 The report reveals 
persistent variation between and within chains in their ability to improve disadvantaged 
pupils’ attainment. Other evidence indicates that sponsored academies in chains 
perform marginally better than standalone sponsored academies. 
2.4 Data 
This chapter is based on extracts from the DfE’s National Pupil Database (NPD), a 
collection of linked administrative datasets providing detailed information on England’s 
state schools and their pupils. The School Census links pupils to the school they attend 
at a given point in time. It contains rich demographic information such as gender, 
ethnicity, first language, as well as month and year of birth. Proxy variables including 
FSM eligibility history capture socioeconomic circumstances. School Census records 
can be directly matched to pupils’ KS1 and KS2 attainment records. I also use data from 
the School Level Database (SLD) to facilitate between school comparisons of aggregate 
pupil demographics and attainment. 
State primary schools are statutorily required to assess their pupils’ attainment using 
national curriculum (NC) assessments. This includes externally set and marked tests 
and externally moderated teacher-based assessments. Primary schools must register 
their pupils for these assessments at the end of key stages 1 and 2 (years (i.e. grades) 2 
and 6). 
The KS2 assessments feature mathematics and reading tests, as well as a combined 
spelling, punctuation and grammar test (since 2012/13). Separately, year six pupils 
undergo teacher assessments in English, mathematics and science. Since 2005, pupils 
                                                 
11 See also Hutchings et al. (2015) 
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receive a teacher assessment in reading, writing, speaking and listening, mathematics 
and science at the end of KS1.12 
Primary NC assessments were graded using a five-point grade scale (levels 1 to 5) until 
2012 when, with the intention of challenging high performing pupils, the government 
introduced level 6. A pupil achieves level 6 at KS2 in a subject if they pass an additional 
test. Consequentially, the grading and difficulty of the level 1 to 5 KS2 tests did not 
systematically change in 2012. Pupils are expected to be working at level 2 at the end 
of KS1. Pupils should make two levels worth of progress throughout KS2. Therefore, 
year six pupils are expected to attain level 4. 
The analysis separately assesses the effects of academy conversion on pupil attainment 
in reading and maths, as academies may on average place greater emphasis on either 
subject than non-academies following the national curriculum. KS2 attainment is 
measured using test marks standardised to zero mean, unit standard deviation. However, 
it is important to note that pupils who are deemed by their schools to be working below 
the level assessed by the KS2 tests gain exemption from the tests. As such, pupils at the 
bottom of the attainment distribution are excluded from the analysis. Including these 
pupils necessitates using NC level point score as the attainment outcome which is a far 
coarser variable.13 This chapter uses this outcome in a robustness exercise. As teacher 
assessment is the exclusive measure of KS1 attainment, the outcome variable for KS1 
analysis is the NC level point score. 
                                                 
12 Pupils previously also sat KS2 writing and science tests, discontinued in 2012 and 2009 respectively. 
Before 2005, KS1 attainment was assessed using formal testing. 
13 The NC level point score is a simple numerical transformation of the NC level. For example, level 1 is 
coded as 9 points, level 2 as 15 points. The NC level point score does not convey any more detail than 
the NC level. 
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This chapter uses a data extract covering school years 2007/08 to 2014/15. 2014/15 is 
the last school year before NC assessments undergo significant reform. The analysis 
uses data on every year 2 and year 6 pupil in each of these school years to determine 
how academy status may affect pupil attainment. Separately, the analysis uses data on 
every reception pupil (the entry-year) to explore whether academy status affects the 
composition of the entry-year intake. Primary schools that do not cover reception and 
key stages 1 and 2 in their entirety or schools that cater to special educational or 
behavioural needs are excluded from the analysis. 14 
2.5 Methodology 
The causal effects of a primary school opting to become a converter academy are 
estimated using difference-in-differences (DiD) models. The baseline estimating 
equation is  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.1) 
where 𝑖, 𝑠 and 𝑡 are pupil, school and school year (i.e. cohort) identifiers respectively. 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 refers generically to an attainment measure. 𝛼𝑠 is a school fixed effect and 𝛼𝑡 is a 
school year (time) effect. Binary variable 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 equals 1 if school 𝑠 is a primary 
converter academy in school year 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. Conversion is an “absorbing” state 
since no academies revert to maintained school status. The parameter of interest is 𝛽1 
representing the estimated average causal effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). This 
is the estimated average change in attainment in converter academies caused by 
conversion to academy status. 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of time-varying pupil-level control 
variables. Under the parallel trends assumption, the error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, is orthogonal to 
                                                 
14 In other words, lower and middles schools are excluded from the analysis. 
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𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡. I assume this term has a school/school year specific component that is 
likely to exhibit serial correlation over time. Therefore, I estimate robust standard errors 
clustered at the school level, as advocated by Bertrand et al. (2004). There are 
approximately 1,300 clusters which exceeds the standard minimum number of clusters 
required to estimate robust clustered standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
When outcome 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a measure of KS2 attainment, a value-added model can be 
estimated using prior KS1 attainment. This model is motivated by the lack of observed 
historical school and parental inputs. These important unobserved inputs are proxied 
using prior attainment. The model incorporates prior KS1 attainment in vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡, 
which assumes the effects of historical inputs experience a common rate of geometric 
decay. The alternative case where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is equal to the difference of current and prior 
attainment assumes prior inputs are as relevant as current inputs.  
The value-added model does not account for contemporaneous changes in parental 
inputs. Parents may interpret a school’s decision to become a converter academy as a 
positive or negative signal of the school’s quality and may adjust their parental inputs 
accordingly. Therefore, the estimated treatment effects are net of the average parental 
response to their child’s school becoming an academy. Value-added models are 
thoroughly critiqued in Todd and Wolpin (2003), which also discusses the unavoidable 
restrictions that such models place on the underlying education production function. 
The analysis extends equation (2.1) in several ways to accommodate different forms of 
treatment effect heterogeneity. Equation (2.1) imposes a constant average treatment 
effect for every school year following academy conversion. It is unlikely that academies 
fully realise and exploit the implications of their enhanced independence straight after 
conversion. Instead, there may be an adjustment period during which academies 
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gradually implement changes that would not have been possible as a maintained school. 
It is appropriate to adopt a specification that allows the treatment effect to vary 
according to the length of time elapsed since conversion occurred. A more flexible 
variant of equation (2.1) is 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑟 𝜏𝑡𝑠
𝜏=2
𝜏=−4
+ 𝛾′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.2) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑌𝑟𝑋𝑡𝑠 equals one if the difference between school year 𝑡 and the school 
year that school 𝑠 becomes an academy is 𝑋 school years, and zero otherwise. This is 
sometimes referred to as the leads and lags DiD estimator and attributed to Autor 
(2003). If the control and treated groups have differential trends in the absence of 
treatment, then the pre-treatment beta estimates (?̂?−4, … , ?̂?−1) will be significantly 
different from zero. Estimates that are not significantly different from zero lend support 
in favour of the identifying assumption. 
26 per cent of primary schools participated in a boycott of KS2 assessment tests in May 
2010. Since participation in the boycott was non-random and widespread, the 2009/10 
school year is dropped from the panel for all KS2 attainment analysis. This means the 
pre-treatment period spans four schools-years (two either side of the dropped year). As 
such, I correct the pre-treatment indicators in equation (2.2) such that, for example, if a 
school becomes an academy in 2012/13, then 2008/09 is coded as the third school year 
before that school’s conversion, and not the fourth school year prior. 
Also, equation (2.1) does not allow the treatment effect to vary between academies with 
different predecessor school types, despite academies experiencing varying degrees of 
autonomy before conversion. As schools experience differential increases in autonomy 
following conversion to academy status, there is an element of treatment intensity which 
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could be captured. I interact a binary variable equal to 1 if an academy was previously 
a community or voluntary-controlled school (𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑠) and 0 otherwise, with 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡. 
In equation (2.3), 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is the ATT for academies which were previously community 
or voluntary-controlled schools, whereas 𝛽1 is the ATT for academies whose 
predecessor school was another maintained school type. 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑠) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.3) 
Specific sub-groups of the pupil population may be affected differently by academy 
conversion than the average pupil. The autonomy accompanying academy status may 
allow academies to redirect their attention and resources towards or away from certain 
pupil groups. An important sub-group is pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. I use 
FSM eligibility to indicate disadvantage. I further estimate equation (2.4). 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐹𝑆𝑀𝑖) + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.4) 
FSM eligibility is recorded in vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡. In equation (2.4), 𝛽1 is the ATT for pupils 
who are ineligible for FSM, while 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is the ATT for FSM pupils. Equations (2.1) 
to (2.4) are estimated using pupil level data. 
For the entry-year intake analysis, the baseline estimating equation is 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 (2.5) 
where 𝑦𝑠𝑡 refers to the entry-year cohort average of a certain pupil characteristic for 
school 𝑠 in school year 𝑡. The interpretation of the equation’s remaining components is 
the same as in the preceding equations. 𝛽1 is the ATT estimate which is the estimated 
average change in the cohort average of a certain attribute of the entry-year intake 
experienced by schools when they become academies. 
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The 𝛽 estimates in equations (2.1) to (2.5) provide unbiased treatment effect estimates 
if the parallel trend assumption holds conditional on the control variable vector 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡. 
The school fixed effect controls for differences in time invariant characteristics between 
treatment and control schools. It remains a possibility that schools become academies 
based on unobserved trends. I depend on the parallel trends assumption to dismiss this 
remaining identification threat. 
The treatment and control groups should be as similar as possible in observed and 
unobserved dimensions; this maximises the likelihood that outcomes for the groups 
share a common time trend in the absence of treatment. While the application procedure 
and criteria for approval for academy conversion changed during the 2010/11 school 
year, it has not significantly changed since. As such, schools that later become 
academies should be similar to already opened academies. 
The treatment group is defined as all schools that become converter academies in the 
school years 2012/13 to 2014/15. The control group is schools that become converter 
academies during the 2015/16 school year. The treatment group includes schools that 
experience one to three school years of academy status. The implication of this research 
design for the primary outcome of interest, value-added at KS2, is that I observe cohorts 
who spend between one and three years of KS2 (which spans four years) at an academy; 
the treatment schools experience academy status for 21 months on average. The 
minimum observed pre-treatment period is four school years. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 compares several measures of attainment and pupil demographics, 
for the year six cohort averaged at school-level, for the last pre-treatment school year, 
between the control and treatment groups. Column (3) tests the equality of means 
between the two groups. The means are not significantly different at conventional levels 
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of significance, providing good evidence that the groups are alike regarding observable 
factors the school year before the first treatment schools become converter academies. 
Panel B of Table 2.3 shows the change in the same school level attainment and 
demographic measures of the year six cohorts between 2007/08 and 2011/12 for the 
control and treatment groups. Column (3) tests whether the difference in the mean 
change is equal between the two groups. There are no statistical differences between 
the groups at typical significance levels. This suggests that the overall trend in these 
measures in the pre-treatment period do not vary between the groups. 
Table 2.4 compares the means of the same variables averaged over the pre-treatment 
period for a more extensive selection of schools. Column (1) shows means for schools 
that become converter academies in 2010/11 and 2011/12. Column (2) and (3) contains 
means for the schools that are considered in this analysis. Comparison of Column (1) 
against columns (2) and (3) suggests that year six pupils in the first schools to become 
converter academies perform significantly better in the pre-treatment period than those 
attending the converter academies included in this paper’s main analysis sample. The 
average KS2 reading standardised test mark in the earliest converters in the pre-
treatment period is 0.17 standard deviations compared to 0.05 standard deviations for 
the converter academies in the treatment and control groups.  The earliest converter 
academies also educate more advantaged pupils (based on eligibility for FSM) than later 
converter academies. Additionally, unreported results show that the trends in these 
variables differ in the pre-treatment period between the earliest converters academies 
and the academies in this paper’s sample. This table demonstrates that the first two 
waves of primary converter academies differ to more recent primary converter 
academies in observable dimensions in the pre-treatment period. As such, there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that they may also differ in unobserved attributes. 
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Consequentially they are not appropriate to include in a research design which exploits 
time variation in conversion to converter academy status. 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 KS2 attainment 
Table 2.5 contains estimates from difference-in-differences (DiD) models with a single 
post-treatment effect. In columns (1) to (3), the outcome is KS2 maths standardised test 
mark. KS2 reading standardised test mark is the outcome variable for columns (4) to 
(6). Columns (1) and (4) feature estimates from a DiD model without any control 
variables. I add control variables in columns (2) and (5), and then add prior attainment 
in each subject in columns (3) and (6) to create a value-added model. The converter 
academy coefficient estimate (found in the first row) corresponds to the estimated effect 
of academy conversion. The estimates are relatively consistent as control variables and 
then KS1 attainment are added, ranging between 0.017 to 0.007 standard deviations. 
None of the estimates are statistically different from zero at the ten per cent significance 
level. This contrasts with the control variable coefficients which are uniformly 
estimated with high precision and are statistically different from zero.  These estimates 
do not provide evidence of a converter academy status effect on KS2 attainment. This 
finding is not sensitive to the measure of KS2 attainment. Appendix Table 2.1 shows 
there is no academy status effect when the dependent variable is the point score 
corresponding to the National Curriculum (NC) level achieved by the pupil (levels 
range from 1 to 6), or a binary variable indicating if the expected NC level (level 4) is 
achieved.  
Appendix Table 2.2 shows that this finding is insensitive to an alternative treatment 
definition and an alternative model specification. The treatment effect estimate may be 
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subject to bias caused by mismeasurement in the treatment variable. The main 
mismeasurement threat comes from schools not operating as academies until they enter 
a full school year as one, despite possibly legally becoming a converter academy 
midway through the previous school year. In Panel A, I calculate the treatment variable 
such that schools are coded as exposed to converter academy status only if they have 
that status at the start of the school year. This does not alter the conclusions that can be 
drawn from Table 2.5. In Panel B, I add school specific linear time trends to investigate 
whether the results are being driven by differential trends in KS2 performance between 
treated and control schools. Estimates of the academy status effect are not sensitive to 
the inclusion of these trends. In the following tables and figures, I present estimates 
from the preferred specification (columns (3) and (6)) only; estimates are not sensitive 
to specification choice.15 
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 plot estimates from models with pre- and post-treatment 
effects. I estimate the effect of being in the treatment group in the years leading up to 
and following treatment. This allows the treatment effect to vary by length of exposure 
and can also be used to assess the validity of the common trends assumption. There 
should be no “effect” from being in the treatment group before treatment. If an “effect” 
is consistently found before treatment, then this raises concerns about the research 
design. In Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, the coefficient estimates for school year 0 
correspond to the estimated academy status effect during the conversion year. 
Coefficient estimates for school years less than 0 correspond to pre-treatment effect 
estimates. Figure 2.1 plots the estimated treatment effects on KS2 maths standardised 
test mark, while the effect on KS2 reading standardised test mark is depicted in Figure 
2.2. The findings from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 are consistent with those from Table 
                                                 
15 Full tables are available upon request. 
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2.5; no statistically significant treatment effect is found for attainment in either subject 
in any treated school year conditional on the control variables and prior attainment. The 
F-test statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis that the pre-treatment coefficient 
estimates are jointly insignificantly different from zero is 1.44 and 1.31 for the maths 
and reading models respectively. Therefore, there is no evidence of differential trends 
between the control and treatment groups before treatment. This suggests that the 
common trends assumption holds. 
It is plausible that academy conversion effects on KS2 attainment exist for sub-
populations of pupils and schools, despite the seeming lack of an effect for the average 
school or pupil. Table 2.6 presents estimates from two models which accommodate 
heterogeneous treatment effects for disadvantaged pupils, and academies which were 
relatively autonomous before conversion. 
Estimates from models allowing the academy conversion effect to vary by FSM 
eligibility are presented in Panel A. This is the best available indicator of whether the 
pupil’s background is disadvantaged.  Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the KS2 maths 
and reading attainment of FSM ineligible pupils are not affected by academy 
conversion. However, there is evidence of a small positive academy conversion effect 
(0.03 standard deviations) on maths and reading attainment for FSM eligible pupils. 
This effect is statistically different from zero at the five per cent significance level. 
Panel B investigates school level heterogeneity; the reported model allows the academy 
conversion effect to vary between former community and voluntary-controlled schools, 
which had the least autonomy before becoming an academy, and voluntary-aided and 
foundation schools which were relatively more autonomous. The academy conversion 
effect on KS2 maths attainment is insignificantly different from zero regardless of the 
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school’s previous structure. However, pupils in former voluntary-controlled and 
community school academies gain 0.036 standard deviations in KS2 reading on 
average. This effect is statistically different from zero at the five per cent significance 
level. There is no effect for pupils from former voluntary-aided or foundation schools. 
The estimated academy conversion effect will be biased if enrolment in the converting 
school is sensitive to the conversion. Parents may interpret the conversion decision as a 
school quality signal and may alter their child’s enrolment accordingly. I estimate DiD 
models based on school-level data to investigate whether becoming a converter 
academy influences the composition of the year six cohorts. Table 2.7 shows that there 
is no academy conversion effect on the observed average characteristics of the year six 
cohorts. Evidence that enrolment decisions are not sensitive to academy conversion is 
found in column (1), which reports that there is no academy conversion effect on the 
percentage of year six pupils who completed KS1 (year two) in the same school. 
2.6.2 KS1 attainment 
Table 2.8 presents estimates of the effect of academy conversion on KS1 maths 
attainment (see the first two columns) and KS1 reading attainment (see the last two 
columns). Since KS1 is the first formal assessment of pupils, there is no opportunity to 
implement a value-added model. This increases the scope for bias from unobserved 
confounders relative to the KS2 value-added models. Additionally, KS1 attainment is 
recorded using teacher assessments which are inherently more subjective. However, 
there is still a good cause to investigate KS1 outcomes. The KS2 value-added models 
show a strong relationship between attainment at KS1 and KS2. Moreover, the 
relationship between attainment at KS1 and KS4 (age 16) is far from trivial. The raw 
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correlation between KS1 maths NC curriculum level and GCSE maths point score is 
0.624; the correlation between age seven and 16 English attainment is 0.59716.  
The estimates of the converter academy coefficient are stable following the inclusion of 
control variables but are insignificantly different from zero both statistically and 
economically; whereas every control variable coefficient is precisely estimated at the 
one per cent level. No evidence is found of an academy conversion effect on KS1 
attainment. This finding is consistent with an unreported dynamic DiD model, in which 
pre- and post-treatment effect estimates are insignificantly different from zero. 
Again, it is possible that the zero average treatment effect on KS1 attainment is masking 
non-zero treatment effects for school and pupil sub-populations. In an unreported 
exercise, I investigate heterogeneous treatment effects at the pupil level (by FSM 
eligibility) and the school level (by predecessor school type). Similar to the KS2 
analysis, I find evidence of a small positive converter academy status effect on reading 
and maths attainment for FSM eligible pupils, but no effect for FSM ineligible pupils. 
I also find evidence of a slight, but statistically significant, positive effect on KS1 
reading and maths attainment in schools which had the least autonomy before 
conversion. 
2.6.3 Entry-year intake 
Finally, I explore whether the composition of schools’ entry-year intake changes 
following academy conversion. Table 2.9 reports the findings from a rudimentary DiD 
model estimated on school-level data where the outcome variables are the percentage 
of the entry-year cohort: eligible for FSM; with SEN; whose first language is English, 
and who are white. The academy coefficients in columns (1) to (3) are insignificantly 
                                                 
16 Author’s own calculations. 
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different from zero suggesting the composition of the entry-year intake for schools is 
not affected by becoming an academy in three of the four characteristics investigated. 
However, column (4)’s estimate suggests that academies experience a 0.6 percentage 
point decline in the proportion of their entry-year intake that is white. 81 per cent of 
entry-year pupils are white in the sample. It is unusual that the composition of the new 
intake would change in this dimension only. Given that the size of the effect is modest 
at best, I opt to place little emphasis on this finding.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to quantify the causal effect of the voluntary conversion of 
English state primary schools into converter academies on pupil attainment, and the 
composition of the entry-year intake. To this end, the staggered nature of academy 
conversions across schools and the availability of a rich administrative dataset are 
exploited in a battery of difference-in-differences models. 
Estimates from these models consistently find no evidence of an academy conversion 
effect on KS2 maths and reading test point scores for the average pupil. However, 
heterogeneous effects models do find evidence of a small positive, but statistically 
significant, KS2 attainment effect for FSM eligible pupils. There is also evidence of a 
small positive effect in KS2 reading attainment for schools that had the least autonomy 
before becoming a primary converter academy. KS1 teacher assessments and the 
composition of the entry-year intake are seemingly unaffected by academy conversion. 
Although these results are consistent with prior research into primary converter 
academies, studies of secondary sponsored academies have found academy status 
effects on attainment. Numerous reasons may explain this discrepancy. Firstly, 
converter academy pupils tend to be more advantaged and academically meritorious 
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than their sponsored academy peers. If the marginal effect of school inputs is 
diminishing, and academy status improves school inputs comparably in converter and 
sponsored academies, then academy status will be more effective in sponsored 
academies where pupils’ attainment is at a lower base level. 
However, academy status means different things for sponsored and converter 
academies. First-generation sponsored academies often enjoyed new or extensively 
refurbished facilities, which is likely to affect pupil attainment positively or at least not 
negatively. Additionally, these academies were highly susceptible to leadership changes 
following conversion (Eyles and Machin, 2018). Converter academies are not more 
likely to undergo leadership changes following their conversions (Eyles et al., 2017).  
Leadership changes may partially explain the difference in the effectiveness of 
converter and sponsored academy conversions. Suppose underperforming schools are 
unattractive to effective head teachers. If sponsored academy status increases the 
attractiveness of an underperforming school to effective head teachers, then sponsored 
academies may improve pupil attainment through attracting a higher calibre of head 
teacher. Converter academies might already be attractive to quality school leaders due 
to their record of good performance. These schools may not attract better leaders 
following conversions, and, therefore, might not experience attainment 
improvements.17 
Differences in the stages of schooling may explain the difference in estimated academy 
status effects. Primary schools are usually smaller than secondary schools, implement 
different teaching methods, and have different educational goals. The freedom of 
academies to set their own curriculum may be more consequential for attainment in 
                                                 
17 If this hypothesis is true, then the effectiveness of sponsored academy status should diminish as the 
sponsored academy sector expands. 
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secondary schools since secondary pupils are formally assessed in a broader range of 
subjects (partially determined by the school); whereas, primary school pupils are 
predominately assessed in numeracy and literacy. Secondly, if the financial benefit from 
becoming an academy results in increased availability of useful school resources, then 
academy status may be more effective at secondary level, as these schools face greater 
per-pupil costs than primary schools. 
Irrespective of the mechanisms driving the differences between the effectiveness of 
sponsored and converter academy status, the lack of evidence of an improvement in the 
attainment of primary converter academies suggests that increasing school autonomy is 
not a panacea in and of itself. This is an important finding given the considerable cost 




Figure 2.1: Pre- and post-treatment effect estimates for KS2 maths test mark 
 
Notes: filled circle denotes coefficient estimate from leads and lags difference in differences model. 
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence interval.  
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Figure 2.2: Pre- and post-treatment effect estimates for KS2 reading test mark 
 
Notes: filled circle denotes coefficient estimate from leads and lags difference in differences model. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Impact of Boycotting Standardised Tests on 
Subsequent School Outcomes 
Standardised tests are a common, yet contentious, feature of many countries’ schooling 
systems. In April 2010, two UK teacher unions called for a boycott of mandatory age 
eleven standardised tests due to be sat in two weeks’ time. One-quarter of the cohort 
was affected. This chapter uses a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the 
effect of preparing for, but ultimately not completing, standardised tests on subsequent 
measures of attainment. This chapter reports evidence of a statistically significant small 
adverse effect on age 14 teacher assessed attainment and age 16 secondary school 
qualification attainment. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in treatment effect 
estimates between sub-populations of pupils. Potential mechanisms are discussed, 




Standardised tests are a near-ubiquitous feature of schooling systems in developed 
nations today. The tests, often sat by entire populations of pupils at critical stages of 
their schooling, are usually an integral component of a school accountability system. In 
England, for example, aggregated results from SATs tests are the headline measure of 
primary school performance reported in school league tables. 
A vast literature on school accountability systems has emerged finding evidence that 
such systems have positive effects on pupil performance (Deming et al., 2016; Neal and 
Schanzenbach, 2010; Rouse et al., 2013). In the UK context, Burgess et al. (2013) report 
evidence that increased school accountability, via the publication of school league 
tables, has a significant positive causal effect on secondary school qualification 
attainment. Although, the attainment effects of the English accountability system are 
heterogeneous, and not beneficial for all pupils (Burgess et al., 2005). While, in the US 
literature, there are significant concerns about teachers cheating (Jacob and Levitt, 
2003) or gaming accountability systems (Figlio, 2006; Figlio and Winicki, 2005). 
Overall, however, the test-based accountability literature suggests that there is an 
external benefit from participation in standardised tests. The information provided by 
participating pupils allows regulators and parents to identify under-performing schools, 
while standardised testing simultaneously incentivises schools to maximise their 
teaching efforts. Both mechanisms benefit individual pupils irrespective of whether 
they sit the standardised test. 
The effect of not participating in standardised tests on subsequent pupil attainment, 
given that pupils can free-ride from other pupils’ participation in such tests is not well 
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understood. That is, it is largely unknown whether there is a private cost or benefit to 
an individual’s participation in a standardised test. 
The contribution of this chapter is to quantify the causal effect of participation in 
standardised tests for individual pupils, while the school accountability system remains 
active and unchanged. To this end, this chapter exploits as a natural experiment a 
widespread but hastily arranged, head teacher-led boycott of one standardised test series 
in England. The boycott prevented one-quarter of the affected cohort from sitting 
mandatory age eleven SATs tests. 
The chapter applies difference-in-difference models to a matched panel of primary 
schools that did and did not participate in the boycott. I find evidence of a small adverse 
boycott participation effect on attainment as measured by age 14 teacher assessments 
and age 16 secondary school qualification achievement. Effects are precisely estimated 
between -0.014 and -0.019 standard deviations on maths and science attainment. Effects 
on English attainment are about half this size but are not estimated with sufficient 
precision to be statistically significant. However, the magnitude and direction of these 
estimated effects exhibit substantial variation across sub-groups of pupils. This chapter 
also presents evidence that the boycott caused a change in pupils’ subject choices at age 
14 and resulted in a slight reduction in absenteeism at secondary school. 
Because the boycott was officially called just two weeks before the SATs tests were 
due to take place, this chapter argues that the treatment effect of participating in the 
boycott merely is that the pupil does not sit the SATs tests, nor receives any feedback 
on their test performance. It is argued there are limited to no systematic differences in 
test preparation between pupils who sit the SATs tests and those that boycott them. 
Primary survey data which supports this proposition is presented. 
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The models reveal that pupils enrolled in schools that boycotted SATs received inflated 
teacher assessments at the time of the boycott, but only in subjects for which tests were 
boycotted. This may be because boycotting primary schools’ performance was 
evaluated using this data for the first time, as the usual test data is necessarily missing. 
The chapter will present an argument that, because of their role in determining 
secondary school qualification grade targets, these inflated teacher assessments drive 
the adverse boycott participation effects on attainment at ages 14 and 16. The inflated 
teacher assessments meant that the boycott affected pupils were expected by the 
government to achieve a higher level of attainment at secondary school than otherwise 
similar non-boycott affected pupils. If secondary schools wish to maximise their success 
rate at meeting grade targets, which were then a feature of secondary school league 
tables, then theoretically teachers should allocate effort away from boycott affected 
pupils for whom the likelihood of achieving their artificially high grade target is 
reduced. Other potential mechanisms are evaluated. 
3.2 Literature review 
School accountability systems – the process of evaluating schools based on pupil 
performance measures – is increasingly commonplace (Figlio and Loeb, 2011). In test-
based systems standardised tests are used to measure pupil performance. With effective 
accountability, principal-agent problems are overcome, and schools are incentivised to 
improve pupil performance.  
In ‘consequential’ test-based accountability systems, schools are explicitly sanctioned 
or rewarded based on their performance in standardised tests (Hanushek and Raymond, 
2005). In England, for example, primary schools may be forced to become academies 
if their SATs test performance is below the ‘floor standard’, and OFSTED, the statutory 
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school inspectorate, consider test performance when determining the ‘overall 
effectiveness’ rating of a school. Implicit sanctions and rewards are also an inevitable 
feature of accountability systems. School test scores (Black, 1999; Gibbons and 
Machin, 2003), as well as overall school ratings (Figlio and Lucas, 2004), are capitalised 
in house prices, indicating the presence of a parental response to school performance 
measures. Charitable donations have also been shown to be affected by school 
performance measures (Figlio and Kenny, 2009). 
The bulk of research into the attainment effects of test-based accountability systems is 
based on the US’s experience with No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the federal 
accountability system introduced in 2002. For example, Dee and Jacob (2011) use a 
long panel to compare state-level achievement since the implementation of NCLB 
between states that previously operated their own accountability systems and those that 
did not. They find evidence of modest (up to 0.2 standard deviations) positive effects 
of test-based accountability on maths achievement.  
Evidence of positive attainment effects is not confined to NCLB studies. Hanushek and 
Raymond (2005), for instance, report positive achievement effects from the introduction 
of consequential accountability across US states in the 1990s. While, Rouse et al. (2013) 
combines administrative data with survey data, and exploits discontinuities in Florida’s 
accountability system to show that low school ratings spur on future achievement gains 
and changes in school policy. Recent evidence reports that the introduction of test-based 
accountability increased both the likelihood pupils achieve a four-year degree and their 
earnings by the age of 25 (Deming et al., 2016). 
Research based on UK data is comparatively sparse, although Burgess et al. (2013) test 
the effects of discontinuing school league tables in Wales. The paper uses a difference-
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in-differences strategy in which English schools, whose performance continued to be 
published publicly, are the control group. The authors find that the reform reduces pupil 
attainment by 0.08 standard deviations. 
The literature is rarely able to exploit variation in pupils’ participation in standardised 
tests while the accountability system is held constant. The present chapter exploits such 
variation, as does Andersen and Nielsen (2016). Their paper investigates the impact of 
participating in national standardised tests on future school attainment in Denmark. The 
tests were computer-based, and compulsory for certain ages. A technical breakdown in 
the IT system meant that pupils signed up to complete the test in the breakdown window 
unexpectedly gained exemption. The authors exploit this exogenous shock to test 
participation and adopt an instrumental variable strategy. They estimate substantial 
positive benefits of testing for pupils, which are larger for pupils enrolled in schools 
with low grades. However, unlike SATs tests, the Danish national tests are formative 
assessments (focused on pupil development) rather than summative (focused on pupil 
attainment). Furthermore, the Danish tests were low-stakes from the perspective of 
schools and teachers, and teachers could re-enrol unexpectedly exempt pupils in the 
tests if they so wished (an endogenous response to an exogenous shock).  
Standardised testing has increasingly been subject to criticism from teachers, parents 
and academics due to the side effects of such testing. One concern is that children are 
subject to unnecessary and unhealthy “test anxiety” or “exam stress” when standardised 
testing is used at early stages of schooling (Connor, 2001, 2003). In England, pupils 
first sit SATs tests at age seven. Undue pressure on pupils can originate from teachers, 
who will be judged on their pupils’ performance, and parents who may overestimate the 
importance of test performance on future attainment (Putwain et al., 2012). 
Standardised tests have also been identified as a source of demotivation among teachers, 
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and a contributing factor to the current teacher recruitment and retention difficulties in 
England (Day and Smethem, 2009). 
The chief criticism of standardised testing arguably is that, when used in high-stakes 
contexts, schools and teachers are incentivised to engage in strategic behaviour which 
may harm pupils’ learning or wellbeing. Tests that have high stakes for schools 
encourage “teaching to the test” whereby untested knowledge, skills (or even subjects) 
are disregarded in favour of testable content. Furthermore, schools may focus on test 
skills rather than the underlying knowledge of the testable content. On this note, 
research in the US has compared longitudinal gains observed in high-stakes 
standardised tests, with gains in low-stakes tests. There is evidence that gains in high-
stakes tests outweigh gains in low-stakes tests (Klein et al., 2000; Koretz, 2002; Koretz 
and Barron, 1998). This may be interpreted as evidence of teaching narrowly to the high 
stakes tests. Evidence from the US and UK has also emerged of schools allocating their 
effort towards pupils whose test scores are most consequential for school performance 
measures (Burgess et al., 2005; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010; Reback, 2008). Surveys 
of primary and secondary school teachers in the UK document evidence of selective 
coaching and mentoring of borderline pupils (West and Pennell, 2000; Wiggins and 
Tymms, 2002). 
There are many other strategic responses to standardised testing. The literature reports 
evidence of schools: changing suspension patterns around the time of tests consistent 
with boosting test-takers’ average scores (Figlio, 2006); changing their meal programs 
around the time of tests (Figlio and Winicki, 2005); reassigning teachers to different 
grades based on which grades are tested (Boyd et al., 2008), and misclassifying pupils 
as having special educational needs (Jacob, 2005). 
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However, teaching to the test may be beneficial in specific circumstances. Lazear 
(2006) theoretically demonstrates that well-defined high-stakes tests are beneficial if 
teachers have low intrinsic motivation, or when pupils are “high cost” learners. 
Teaching to the test may also be beneficial if test scores are a reliable gauge of 
productivity-enhancing skills (Hanushek, 2011). 
3.3 Institutional background 
3.3.1 Standardised assessment in England 
The precursor to the mandatory standardised assessment of pupils in English state 
schools was the adoption of the Education Reform Act in 1988. The Act harmonised 
the curriculum and organisational structure of schools across England. The legislation 
introduced the national curriculum. All state schools were expected to deliver the 
curriculum which defined four key stages (KS) of schooling: grades 1 and 2 (KS1); 
grades 3 to 6 (KS2); grades 7 to 9 (KS3), and grades 10 and 11 (KS4). KS1 and KS2 
are typically taught at primary schools and KS3 and KS4 at secondary schools. 
Before the Act, pupils in English schools were formally assessed only at the end of 
secondary schooling (also the end of KS4) when they would sit examinations in 
nationally recognised O-Level or CSE qualifications. However, to support the national 
curriculum, the Act specified that pupils should be assessed at the end of each key stage 
“for the purpose of ascertaining what they have achieved in relation to the attainment 
targets for that stage” (Education Reform Act 1988, 1, 2 (2)). 
The Task Group on Assessment and Teaching (TGAT) was responsible for developing 
the new assessment system, which they determined must satisfy several distinct 
purposes. The system should: provide information on the achievement of pupils; enable 
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teachers to plan the next stage(s) for pupils; provide information on the aggregated 
achievement of pupils (to evaluate the functioning of schools and teachers); and provide 
information to parents to inform school choice decisions (Whetton, 2009). 
KS1 assessment was introduced in 1991, while KS2 and KS3 assessment followed in 
1994. KS4 attainment would continue to be measured by achievement in secondary 
school qualifications. At that time, SATs consisted of standardised tests and teacher 
assessments (which had notionally equal status) at all key stages1. The tests are 
externally marked and are subject to stringent procedures for maintaining standards. 
Teacher assessments are subject to an external moderation procedure. 
Until recently, the assessments measure attainment using integer grades known as 
national curriculum levels, which range from one to eight. Pupils were expected to be 
working at level 2 at the end of KS1. Pupils should make two levels of progress between 
each key stage, meaning that pupils should achieve levels 4 and 6 at the end of KS2 and 
KS3, respectively. Secondary school qualifications use different grading systems but 
are mapped onto national curriculum levels to measure pupils’ progress at secondary 
schools. In the first three key stages, pupils are assessed in the core subjects of English, 
maths and science. English assessment consists of an overall national curriculum level, 
and separate levels for reading, writing, speaking and listening, and spelling, 
punctuation and grammar depending on the key stage and policy at the time of 
assessment. 
The arrangements for SATs were mostly unchanged until 2005 when the government 
reformed KS1 assessment and dropped tests in favour of more detailed teacher 
assessments. Testing at KS3 met the same fate in 2009 when the government concluded 
                                                 
1 SATs are officially known as National Curriculum Assessments but are rarely referred to as such. 
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that parents obtained the same information from GCSE exam results as KS3 test results. 
KS2 testing continued, although from 2009 onwards only a subset of schools is required 
to administer science tests to monitor national standards. 
3.3.2 The KS2 SATs boycott 
The teaching profession in the United Kingdom is highly unionised. Some teacher 
unions have been vocal critics of standardised testing, and, on occasion, opposition to 
SATs tests led to threats to boycott them. In a 1993 National Union of Teachers (NUT) 
ballot, 90 per cent of teachers said they would support a boycott of KS3 SATs tests. The 
government bowed to pressure and cancelled that year’s SATs tests (Whetton, 2009). 
In April 2003, at their annual conference, the NUT voted unanimously to hold an 
official ballot for a boycott of SATs for the 2003/04 school year. However, as the 
turnout of an indicative ballot the following December was only 34 per cent, the boycott 
never materialised. Although, 86 per cent of those who voted were in favour of a 
boycott. In May 2006, another union, the National Association of Headteachers 
(NAHT) debated asking parents to take their eleven-year-olds out of school on the days 
of SATs tests as part of their campaign against KS2 SATs. The union ultimately did not 
adopt this position. 
Despite their multiple failed attempts to boycott SATs tests, the two unions would 
successfully lead a boycott of KS2 (age eleven, end of primary school) SATs tests 
during the 2009/10 school year. At their annual conference in April 2009, NUT 
delegates voted to ballot members on whether they would be willing to refuse to 
administer the SATs tests. One month later, 94 per cent of delegates at the NAHT 
conference instructed their union to continue to campaign against SATs including, as a 
last resort, holding a ballot on whether to boycott SATs. Both motions stated that a 
boycott would be a last resort and that dialogue with the Department for Children 
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Schools and Families (DCSF) was preferred. In November that year, the two unions 
jointly asked their entire membership if they supported a boycott of SATs. This was not 
an official ballot, under industrial legislation, but was an exercise in gauging the mood 
of their membership. 75 per cent of respondents backed a boycott, but turnout for this 
vote was perceived to be low (around 25 per cent of the unions’ membership, rising to 
35 per cent of those in leadership positions). In late January, the two unions announced 
that an official ballot compliant with salient industrial legislation would be held.  
Only primary school head teachers, their deputies and assistant head teachers were 
balloted. The two unions combined represented the leadership of 80 per cent of 
England’s primary schools. Head teachers were asked: “In order to protect your terms 
and conditions of employment, are you prepared to take industrial action short of strike 
action to frustrate the administration of national curriculum tests in English and 
Mathematics?” 
The ballot opened on 15th March 2010 and closed one month later. Results were 
immediately announced. 61 per cent of NAHT and 75 per cent of NUT voters were in 
favour of a boycott. Turnout was 50 per cent and 34 per cent for NAHT and NUT 
members respectively. 28.8 per cent of eligible voters cast a vote in favour of the 
boycott. On 21st April 2010, the unions confirmed that they would be pressing ahead 
with industrial action in the form of the boycott. The KS2 SATs were scheduled for the 
week commencing the 10th May 2010, meaning there was a very short window between 
the boycott being confirmed by the unions and the tests being sat. 
Participation in the boycott was the sole prerogative of head teachers since legally only 
they could oversee certain aspects of the tests’ administration. 26 per cent of primary 
schools boycotted the KS2 tests in the 2009/10 school year. Figure 3.1 shows the 
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proportion of pupils without a valid KS2 test mark in English and maths for eight 
cohorts of year six pupils. In other school years, compliance with SATs tests was high. 
Of the unaffected cohorts shown in Figure 3.1, fewer than 0.5 per cent of pupils 
unexpectedly fail to sit both English and maths KS2 SATs tests. 
It is essential to understand what the average implications of the SATs boycott were for 
the affected pupils. Answers to two questions will reveal the nature of the treatment. 
Firstly, when during the school year did a head teacher decide to participate in the 
boycott? Secondly, how did the decision to participate in the boycott affect primary 
schools’ conduct? 
Suppose head teachers decided to participate in the boycott at the last possible moment: 
on the morning of the first test. In this scenario, treatment merely is that pupils do not 
sit the tests and do not receive a test mark. Alternatively, suppose that the decision to 
boycott does not affect the conduct of the school in any tangible fashion. In this second 
scenario, the nature of the treatment is identical. However, finally suppose that head 
teachers decide to participate in the boycott at the start of school year and that the 
decision to boycott meaningfully alters the behaviour of the school. In this third 
scenario, the treatment differs. Treatment is that pupils do not sit the test, nor receive a 
test mark, and are exposed to a school year’s worth of altered school inputs (perhaps a 
reduced emphasis on “teaching to the test”). These are the two limiting cases of 
treatment. 
These two questions are empirical. Unfortunately, data did not exist to answer them. I 
rely on institutional circumstances to argue that schools were likely to delay their 
boycott participation decision and that schools were unlikely to change their behaviour 
in anticipation of the boycott. 
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Head teachers and their employers, school governing bodies, had statutory obligations 
to ensure that the KS2 SATs test arrangements were implemented. Head teachers that 
failed to carry out this responsibility were in breach of their employment contracts. The 
local government employers’ association advised school governing bodies to deduct 
pay from head teachers who participated in the boycott. The decision to participate in 
the boycott was costly to head teachers. I argue that this cost was prohibitively high 
before the NUT and NAHT’s call for their members to take part in industrial action. 
Head teachers were only protected from dismissal from their positions after the unions 
officially called for industrial action on 21st April 2010. For this reason, I contend that 
head teachers would have decided to participate in the boycott late in the school year, 
making any significant test preparation or “teaching to the test” effects unlikely. 
I further argue that it is unlikely that primary schools who participated in the boycott 
were less prone to teach to the test in anticipation of the boycott. Primary schools can 
teach to the test for two reasons: they may feel it is a valid pedological approach, or 
they may want to maximise the performance data on which they are judged. If boycott 
participation were to induce a primary school to stop teaching to the test, then it must 
be that the school teaches to the test for the latter reason; the pedological value of 
teaching to the test is independent of the boycott’s existence. If a primary school stopped 
teaching to the test before they were confident that the boycott would go ahead, and 
arguably before they knew whether other local primary schools would participate, then 
they would be risking the performance data which they have shown a keen interest to 
maximise by teaching to the test in the first place. Primary schools could only be 
confident that an organised boycott would take place from late April. Even at this point 
the government was seeking legal advice on the legality of the proposed boycott. If the 
government obtained an injunction, the unions could not have endorsed the boycott or 
 65 
 
else they would have faced sequestration of funds. It is also important to note that the 
industrial action did not cover classroom teachers. They had no union protection to 
refuse any instruction from school leaders to prepare their pupils for SATs tests.  
With these arguments in mind, I propose that the nature of the treatment from 
participation in the boycott merely is that affected pupils do not participate in the test. 
Consequentially, pupils do not receive a mark but are similarly prepared for the test as 
those that do participate (until 12 school days before the test).  
Other arguments exist, although primary survey data provides a degree of support for 
this argument. The incumbent head teacher of every primary school still operating 
which participated in the boycott was invited by email to complete a short online survey. 
Email addresses were sourced from the Department for Education (DfE). Over 95 per 
cent of emails were successfully delivered. The response rate was low (3.2 per cent). 
However, this was expected as nearly eight years had elapsed since the boycott. In total, 
119 head teachers responded to the survey. Head teachers were asked to participate if 
they were confident they could recall the circumstances of the boycott. 63 per cent of 
head teachers confirmed that their school decided to participate in the boycott only once 
the ballot was officially called, compared to 17 per cent of headteachers who indicated 
that the decision to boycott was made at the beginning of the school year. Furthermore, 
59 per cent of head teachers said that their participation in the boycott did not result in 
a “change in the emphasis placed on preparing pupils for the SATs tests”. Only 14 per 
cent of head teachers said that there was “definitely” less emphasis placed on preparing 
pupils for the SATs tests. Of this last group, most head teachers had also indicated that 




The data source used in this chapter is an extract from the DfE’s National Pupil 
Database (NPD). The NPD is an administrative dataset oft used by researchers, within 
its scope are all state schools and their pupils in England. 
I combine pupil level School Census records which identify the school attended and 
contains demographic data such as gender, ethnicity, first or native language, special 
education needs (SEN) status, free school meal (FSM) eligibility and month and year 
of birth. Using each pupil’s unique identifier, these records are linked to attainment data 
for KS1 to KS4. Attainment is measured in maths, English and science at KS1 to KS3, 
with a much broader set of attainment measures available at KS4. 
The primary analysis uses data on the entire population of eight successive cohorts of 
English state school pupils. The sample begins with the cohort who completed KS2 in 
the 2003/04 school year and ends with those who finished KS2 in the 2010/11 school 
year. Pupils would complete compulsory schooling (KS4) five years later. Throughout 
this chapter, cohorts are referred to per their final school year of KS2. The KS2 SATs 
test boycott affected the 2009/10 cohort. In the sample, this cohort is preceded by six 
unaffected cohorts, and succeeded by another unaffected cohort. 
Boycott participation was determined at the primary school level. For the affected 
cohort and within each primary school, I calculate the number of pupils who do not 
have a valid KS2 test mark as a percentage of the number of pupils expected to have a 
valid KS2 test mark. This is calculated separately for English and maths tests. A school 
is defined as participating in the boycott if, of their pupils expected to have a valid KS2 
test mark, at least 90 per cent do not have a valid mark in either English or maths. There 
are only four primary schools for which this percentage is calculated as greater than 90 
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per cent but less than 100 per cent. This indicator of boycott participation exactly 
matches the boycott participation flag produced by the DfE. Every primary school that 
boycotted the KS2 maths tests also boycotted the English tests. However, a limited 
number of primary schools, equivalent to 0.4 per cent of the population of primary 
schools, boycott only the KS2 English tests. 
Pupils are exempt from participating in the KS2 SATs tests if their teacher can 
objectively conclude that they are working below the level assessed by the tests. If a 
primary school’s entire cohort of pupils is exempt from the KS2 SATs, then the school 
cannot take a stance on whether to participate in the boycott. No mainstream schools 
were in this situation. However, many primary schools catering exclusively for pupils 
with special educational needs were. These primary schools do not feature in the 
analysis. Primary schools were also dropped from the analysis if they did not have at 
least one observed pupil in each of the cohorts in the sample. Pupils attending all other 
primary schools feature in the analysis.  
This chapter investigates the boycott participation effect on various measures of 
attainment. These measures are: KS2 teacher assessments, KS3 teacher assessments, 
and KS4 GCSE (and equivalents) attainment. Pupils receive separate teacher 
assessment in maths, English and science at the end of KS2 and KS3. Teacher 
assessments are graded using integer grades known as national curriculum levels (and 
sublevels in the case of KS1 teacher assessments). 
The KS4 attainment measures are: the pupil’s highest point score achieved in a maths 
GCSE qualification; highest point score achieved in an English GCSE qualification; the 
highest point score achieved in a science GCSE (or equivalent) qualification; an 
indicator of whether the pupil achieved five or more GCSEs (or equivalents) at grades 
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A* to A, and an indicator of whether the pupil achieved five or more GCSEs (or 
equivalents) at grades A* to C. 
All attainment outcomes apart from the binary “threshold” GCSE attainment measures 
are standardised across the cohort to zero mean, unit standard deviation. Each 
attainment outcome is recorded for all cohorts except KS3 attainment data which is not 
available for the 2010/11 cohort as the DfE stopped collecting this information from 
schools.  
KS1 teacher assessments in English, maths and science, conducted when the pupil is 
aged seven (four years before the KS2 SATs test and teacher assessments), are the sole 
measure of prior ability recorded. KS1 teacher assessment in the relevant subject is 
included as a covariate in the DiD models facilitating a value-added approach.    
Two non-attainment outcomes are also considered: subject choice and school 
absenteeism. It is common for pupils to choose which subjects to study for secondary 
school qualifications throughout KS4. Although some subjects – such as English, maths 
and science – are compulsory. I measure subject choice in three ways. Firstly, I 
construct a dummy variable ‘EBacc’ which is equal to 1 if the pupil studies and enrols 
in GCSE qualifications for English, mathematics, history or geography, two sciences 
and a modern or accident language, and 0 otherwise. The EBacc (English 
Baccalaureate) subjects are believed by the government to be important for young 
people to study at KS4 level. Research suggests that studying an EBacc compatible 
curriculum is associated with improved further and higher education prospects 
(Moulton et al., 2018). Secondly, I construct another dummy variable ‘STEM’ which 
is equal to 1 when a pupil works towards three or more GCSEs in STEM subjects, and 
0 otherwise. Thirdly, I construct another dummy variable ‘Vocational’ which equals 1 
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if the pupil enrols in at least one vocational GCSE, and 0 otherwise. These three 
measures were proposed by Henderson et al. (2018). 
Regarding school absenteeism, I measure the number of the sessions missed in a school 
year due to: authorised absences, unauthorised absences and both types of absences. 
Each school day consists of two sessions (a morning and an afternoon session), and 
there are at least 190 school days in a year. Unlike all other outcomes which are 
measured at pupil level, absentee data is available at a pupil by school year level. Data 
is available on absenteeism for each year of secondary school and the last two years of 
primary school, for pupils in the 2006/07 to 2010/11 KS2 cohorts. 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Attainment and subject choice outcomes 
The impact on a pupil’s attainment and subject choice from their primary school’s 
participation in the SATs boycott is estimated using a series of difference-in-differences 
(DiD) models. I estimate the following baseline equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝐵𝑜𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑠 × 2009/2010𝑐 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 (3.1) 
where 𝑖, 𝑠 and 𝑐 are pupil, primary school and cohort identifiers respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐 refers 
to a measure of attainment or subject choice. 𝛼𝑠 represents primary school fixed effects: 
the mean difference in pupil attainment (or subject choice) between primary schools. 
This accounts for all time invariant primary school specific impacts on pupil attainment 
(or subject choice). 𝛼𝑐 signifies cohort effects and controls for shocks that are common 
to all pupils in each cohort. 𝐵𝑜𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑠 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if primary 
school 𝑠 participated in the boycott, and 0 otherwise. 2009/2010𝑡 is a second indicator 
variable equal to 1 if cohort 𝑐 is the 2009/10 year six cohort, and 0 otherwise. 𝛽 is the 
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parameter of interest and represents the estimated average causal effect of treatment on 
the treated (ATT). 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of the following pupil level control variables: female 
indicator; white ethnicity indicator; English is first language indicator; FSM eligibility 
indicator; month of birth effects. For models of attainment outcomes, 𝑋𝑖 also contains 
KS1 teacher assessment point score (either the average teacher assessment, or the 
teacher assessment for the appropriate subject). This vector ostensibly controls for 
student sorting into primary schools based on observable pre-determined 
characteristics. 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term containing all remaining variation in 
pupil attainment. 
The DiD 𝛽 estimator will be unbiased under three conditions. Firstly, in the absence of 
the boycott, outcomes for pupils enrolled in boycotting primary schools must share a 
common time (i.e. cohort) trend with pupils enrolled at other schools – the parallel 
trends assumption. That is, 𝛼𝑐
0 = 𝛼𝑐
1 ∀𝑐 where superscripts denote membership of the 
control group (0) and treatment group (1). Secondly, for the cohort impacted by 
treatment, there are no unobserved shocks that are common to either group. That is, 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑠
0 |𝑐 = 2009/10] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑠
1 |𝑐 = 2009/10]. The final assumption, as is required 
when the DiD estimator is applied to repeated cross-sections, is that there are no 
unobserved compositional changes within the groups between cohorts. 
The parallel trends assumption cannot be formally tested due to the missing 
counterfactual problem. However, robust evidence in its favour can be uncovered by 
testing for differential trends between the treatment and control groups for cohorts 
unaffected by the boycott. I estimate the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑐 + Σ𝑐=2004/05
2010/11
 𝛽𝑐𝐵𝑜𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑠 × 𝑐 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 (3.2) 
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where all identifiers and variables are defined as per equation (3.1). 𝛽𝑐 denotes the 
estimated difference between the attainment of pupils in the treatment and control group 
relative to the baseline cohort (2003/04) conditional on a common cohort effect and the 
other covariates and school-fixed effects. If ?̂?𝑐 ≠ 0 ∃𝑐 ≠ 2009/10, then this means that 
there is an “effect” from being in the treatment group for a non-treated cohort, implying 
a departure from the parallel trends assumption. ?̂?𝑐 = 0 ∀𝑐 ≠ 2009/10 indicates that 
the parallel trends assumption holds for non-treated cohorts but provides no information 
regarding its applicability for the treated cohort. 
Since the identifying assumptions cannot be explicitly tested, they must be justified 
through a well-reasoned choice of control group. The assumptions are most credible 
when there are no differences between the mean observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the treatment and control groups, other than exposure to treatment 
(participation in the boycott). 
3.5.2 Selecting the control group 
Identifying an appropriate control group is challenging in this case. All primary schools 
led by a head teacher who held membership of the NUT or NAHT unions (over 80 per 
cent of English state primary schools) were eligible to participate in the boycott. It is 
not possible to observe the trade union affiliation of head teachers. In any case, head 
teacher trade union membership was not a definitive assignment rule as fewer than half 
of the primary schools eligible to participate in the boycott elected to do so.  
Given the unobserved nature of the treatment assignment mechanism, a data-driven 
approach is used to identify a suitable control group. For each school, I estimate the 
propensity score of treatment and use a simple matching procedure to select the control 
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group2. The propensity score is estimated using a Probit model. The model features, as 
independent variables, time-invariant school characteristics, and school-cohort 
characteristics separately for each of the pre-treatment years in the model. The time-
invariant school characteristics are an urban setting indicator; a local authority-
controlled school indicator; indicators for the school’s most recent OFSTED Overall 
Effectiveness rating and local authority fixed effects. The school-cohort characteristics 
are: proportion that are white ethnicity; proportion that are female; proportion that speak 
English as their first language; proportion that are eligible for FSM; average prior 
attainment as measured separately by KS1 English, maths and science teacher 
assessments; school size; cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio. The propensity score 
model does not include any of the dependent variables in the DiD models.  
The left panel of Figure 3.2 depicts kernel density estimates of the propensity score of 
primary schools by boycott participation. Unsurprisingly, participating schools are 
estimated to have a much higher probability of involvement in the industrial action, 
with most of the non-participating schools having estimated propensity scores of less 
than 20 per cent. I attempt to match each boycotting primary school to a non-boycotting 
primary school but enforce a restrictive calliper of 0.001 to allow only close matches. 
Non-boycotting primary schools are not replaced once matched which maximises the 
size of the control group and ensures schools in the matched sample are equally 
weighted. There are many participating and non-participating schools, and the overlap 
of the estimated propensity scores between these two groups is significant. Of the 3,824 
boycotting primary schools in the full sample 3,179 are matched to a non-boycotting 
primary school (a match rate of 83 per cent). The right panel of Figure 3.2 presents the 
                                                 
2 For the avoidance of doubt, this is not a matched difference-in-difference estimator; this is a difference 
in difference estimator where matching is used to select a control group from the population of potential 
control group constituents. 
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estimated propensity score distribution of the matched sample, which are nearly 
identical between the boycott participators and non-participators. 
Table 3.1 presents the mean of several school characteristics and school-cohort 
characteristics (averaged over the 2003/04 to 2008/09 cohorts) for primary schools that 
participated in the boycott and those that did not. The difference in the means between 
these groups of primary schools is estimated. The first three columns include the full 
sample of primary schools, and the last three columns include the matched sample. Raw 
attainment measures are reported, not their standardised counterparts. 
In the full sample of schools, pupils enrolled in boycotting primary schools have lower 
attainment than other pupils at every key stage, and these differences are statistically 
different from zero at the one per cent significance level for all 16 attainment measures. 
However, the economic significance of these differences is often quite small but does 
increase throughout the key stages. 
Overall, boycotting primary schools educated more disadvantaged pupils relative to 
non-boycotting primary schools. The proportion of the cohort eligible for FSM is 5.5 
percentage points higher in primary schools that participated in the boycott (from a base 
of 23 per cent). Boycotting primary schools also educate 4.1 and 5.2 percentage points 
more pupils who, respectively, do not speak English as a first language and are ethnic 
minorities.  
Addressing school characteristics, urban schools were much more likely to participate 
in the boycott than rural schools. The NAHT speculates that this is because it was easier 
for head teachers of urban schools to coordinate with other local head teachers and 
collectively decide whether to participate in the boycott. The proportion of boycotting 
primary schools rated ‘Outstanding’ or ‘Good’ by OFSTED was slightly larger than the 
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corresponding proportion for primary schools that did not participate in the industrial 
action. This may be because these schools could rely on their OFSTED rating to signal 
their quality to parents and thus KS2 test data was less crucial to the primary school. 
The final column shows the difference in the means for boycotting primary schools and 
non-boycotting primaries within the matched sample. None of the differences in the 
attainment measures is statistically significant at the one per cent significance level, nor 
are any of the differences in school characteristics. Two of the school cohort 
characteristics are statistically different from zero at the ten per cent significance level. 
The table indicates that the matching procedure has achieved its aim of achieving 
covariate balance between the treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment periods. 
One assumes that covariate balance between the groups is most likely to lead to balance 
in unobservable characteristics between the groups. The parallel trends assumption is 
most credible when there are no systematic observable or unobservable differences 
between the groups. 
3.5.3 School absenteeism outcomes 
Because school absenteeism outcomes are available on a yearly basis for pupils, a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences model can be estimated. I estimate the following 
baseline equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑠𝑐 + 𝜆𝑔𝑐 + 𝜆𝑠𝑔 + Σ𝑔=5,7,8,9,10,11 𝛽𝑔𝐵𝑦𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑠 × 𝐵𝑦𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑐 × 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑔
+𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔 (3.3)
 
Where 𝑖, 𝑠, 𝑐, 𝑔 are pupil, primary school, cohort and grade identifiers respectively. 𝛼 is 
the constant term. 𝜆𝑠𝑐 is a primary school cohort fixed effect, 𝜆𝑔𝑐 is a grade by cohort 
fixed effect and 𝜆𝑠𝑔 is a primary school by grade fixed effect. 𝐵𝑦𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑠 equals 1 if 
primary school 𝑠 participated in the boycott and 0 otherwise. 𝐵𝑦𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑐 is equal to 1 if 
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cohort 𝑐 is the 2009/10 KS2 cohort (the pupils affected by the boycott) and otherwise 
is 0.  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑔 is equal to 1 if the observation relates to attendance in year/grade 𝑔, and 
0 otherwise. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑔 is an error term clustered at the primary school level. 𝛽7 to 𝛽11 are 
the coefficients of interest and measure how absenteeism in years/grades 7 to 11 are 
affected by participation in the boycott. 𝛽5 indicates how absenteeism in year/grade 5 
is affected by the boycott. This coefficient estimate should be statistically zero, as this 
grade will have been completed in advance of the boycott. 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Main results 
Table 3.2 represents the principal analysis of the impact of the SATs boycott on 
subsequent measures of pupil attainment. The table reports the point and standard error 
estimates of the parameter of interest from eleven different DiD models on the matched 
sample. Each model has a different outcome variable. The estimates found in columns 
(1) to (3) correspond to models in which the outcome variable is a subject-specific KS2 
(age eleven) teacher assessment; the next three columns model KS3 (age 14) teacher 
assessments, and the final five columns consider KS4 (age 16, secondary school 
qualification) attainment measures. Models are estimated on a common sample of 
pupils. To facilitate comparison of the parameter of interest estimates across outcomes, 
the outcomes in columns (1) to (9) are standardised to zero mean, unit standard 
deviation. The outcomes in the last two columns are indicator variables. 
Columns (1) and (2) indicate that pupils from school-cohorts that boycotted SATs tests 
were assessed to be higher achievers by their own teachers than previous and future 
cohorts in their school. KS2 teacher assessments in maths and English were, 
respectively, 0.023 and 0.046 standard deviations higher for pupils affected by the 
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boycott. These estimates are statistically different from zero at the one per cent 
significance level. KS2 teacher assessments in science were seemingly unaffected by 
the boycott. KS2 teacher assessments are carried out at the time of the KS2 SATs 
boycott.  
There are several reasons why these assessments might be inflated for pupils affected 
by the boycott. First, given that school-level test attainment data was necessarily 
missing for schools that participated in the boycott, the importance of teacher 
assessment data to the boycotting schools increased. OFSTED used school level teacher 
assessment data in the absence of test data. Teacher assessment data was also available 
to the public via school league tables. Therefore, primary schools that boycotted had a 
greater incentive to maximise KS2 teacher assessment outcomes in the boycott year 
than they ever did before or subsequently. Secondly, primary schools that engaged in 
the industrial action had an incentive to demonstrate it was a positive decision for their 
pupils. One mechanism of achieving this is through favourable teacher assessments. 
The boycott affected cohort were never due to sit a KS2 test in science, and there is no 
boycott effect on KS2 science teacher assessments. This is consistent with both 
arguments above. KS2 teacher assessments are important to consider as they are 
consequential for targets, set by the government, for pupils’ secondary school 
attainment in English and maths (where KS2 test data is missing). 
Columns (4) to (6) show the estimated boycott participation effect on KS3 teacher 
assessments. These teacher assessments are conducted three years after pupils should 
have completed the KS2 tests by teachers unconnected to the industrial action. Despite 
being assessed at a higher level of attainment in primary school, these subsequent 
assessments found affected pupils to be doing significantly worse. Evidence of an 
adverse boycott effect is found at the one per cent significance level in maths and 
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science. Effect magnitudes are modest: respectively, 0.014 standard deviations and 
0.024 standard deviations. The point estimate for KS3 English teacher assessment is -
0.012 but is not precisely estimated. We would anticipate more significant impacts on 
maths and science as attainment in these subjects is more persuadable to school inputs, 
whereas English attainment is more susceptible to non-school inputs. KS3 teacher 
assessments are worth considering since, unlike KS4 outcomes, they are low stakes 
from the perspective of schools, and should not reflect test skills which qualification 
attainment might. 
Columns (7) to (9) display the estimated effect of boycott participation on GCSE 
attainment in maths and English, and GCSE (or equivalent) attainment in science. The 
estimated effects of the boycott on GCSE attainment are comparable to the estimated 
effect on KS3 teacher assessment. Participation in the boycott is estimated to reduce 
maths attainment at this level by 0.019 standard deviations. This estimate is statistically 
different from zero at the one per cent significance level. The estimated effects on 
English attainment (-0.010 standard deviations) and science attainment (-0.012 standard 
deviations) are not precisely estimated. Column (10) indicates that boycott participation 
did not affect the likelihood of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs/equivalents at 
grades A* to A. However, Column (11) shows an adverse effect of 0.6 percentage points 
on the likelihood of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs/equivalents at grades A* to 
C. 
Any differential trend in attainment outcomes by boycott participation would bias the 
estimates presented in Table 3.2. To gauge whether differential trends existed between 
the two groups of schools for cohorts unaffected by the boycott, Figures 3.3-3.6 presents 
the estimated effect of participating in the boycott on outcomes for cohorts affected and 
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unaffected by the cohort. In more precise terms, the treatment group indicator interacts 
with cohort effects for all cohorts other than the first cohort in the sample.3 
Figure 3.3 reports the estimated ‘effect’ of participating in the boycott on unaffected 
and affected cohorts for KS2 outcomes. There is no evidence of a differential trend in 
English, maths and science KS2 teacher assessments between the treatment and control 
schools for any of the unaffected cohorts. Figure 3.4 shows that there is no differential 
trend in KS3 maths teacher assessment. For both KS3 English and science teacher 
assessments, one of the five boycott participation effect estimates for unaffected cohorts 
is statistically non-zero at the five per cent significance level.  
Figure 3.5 shows that none of the boycott participation effect point estimates on 
unaffected cohorts is statistically different from zero for GCSE maths and English. The 
boycott participation effect estimate on GCSE science on the cohort two-years prior 
affected cohort is statistically different from zero. However, the trend in this outcome 
between the treatment and control groups is otherwise identical. Finally, Figure 3.6 
applies the flexible trends analysis for the threshold measures of overall GCSE 
attainment. All twelve point estimates of the boycott participation effect on unaffected 
cohorts are not statistically different from zero. For all outcomes studied, Figures 3.3 to 
3.6 provides compelling, but not definitive, evidence in favour of the parallel trends 
assumption. Appendix Table 3.1 reproduces Figures 3.3 to 3.6 in tabular form. 
The large sample size makes it possible to estimate heterogenous effects of boycott 
participation precisely. Treatment effect heterogeneity is investigated at pupil and 
school level. 
                                                 
3 The interaction term with the first cohort is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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Panel A of Table 3.3 investigates heterogeneity in the estimated boycott participation 
effect by gender. At KS2 level, treatment effect heterogeneity exists only for the English 
teacher assessments. The boycott induced inflation in English teacher assessments is 
larger for boys than girls. The situation reverses at KS3 level, boycott participation is 
estimated to hurt boys’ Maths and Science teacher assessments, but there is no 
corresponding effect for girls. Meanwhile, there is a negative effect on girls’ English 
teacher assessments but no effect on boys’. At KS4 level, there is no statistical 
difference in the estimated effect on GCSE maths point scores and the likelihood of 
achieving five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C between boys and girls. However, 
boycott participation has a sizeable negative effect on girls’ English attainment, but a 
slight positive effect on boys’ English attainment. The situation reverses for science: 
boys are negatively impacted by the boycott, whereas there is not a statistically 
significant effect for girls. 
Panel B considers treatment effect heterogeneity between white ethnicity pupils and 
ethnic minorities. For some outcomes, there are apparent differences in the boycott 
participation effect by ethnicity. At KS2 level, English and maths teacher assessments 
are most inflated for ethnic minorities. At KS3 level, white pupils are harmed more by 
the boycott than non-white pupils. At KS4 level, the adverse effect of boycott 
participation is generally greater for white pupils than ethnic minority pupils. 
Panel C examines how the treatment effect estimate differs between pupils eligible for 
FSM and ineligible pupils. The inflation of KS2 teacher assessments in English and 
maths is much greater for pupils eligible for FSM. A consistent pattern is also found at 
KS3 and KS4 levels. Pupils who are ineligible for FSM are more adversely affected by 
boycott participation than eligible pupils. FSM eligible pupils are estimated to benefit 
from boycott participation. 
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FSM eligibility, ethnicity and to a lesser extent gender are associated with attainment. 
Treatment effect heterogeneity in these outcomes may be reflecting heterogeneity by 
ability. Ability is unobserved but can be proxied using prior achievement (as measured 
by KS1 teacher assessments). Panel D reports the estimates of a model that allows the 
boycott participation effect to vary between high and low prior achievers. Pupils whose 
average KS1 teacher assessment point score is greater than the expected level (17 
points) are coded as high ability; all other pupils are coded as low ability. The KS2 
teacher assessments of pupils with low prior attainment are inflated more than high prior 
attainment students. At KS3 and KS4 level, generally, the high prior attainment pupils 
are more adversely affected by boycott participation than low KS1 attainment pupils. 
Some of the differences in the estimated effects by prior attainment are large. For 
example, the boycott participation effect on KS3 English teacher assessment is -0.075 
standard deviations for high KS1 attainment pupils, but +0.015 for low KS1 attainment 
pupils. For KS4 English attainment, the estimated effect is -0.096 standard deviations 
for prior high achievers and +0.32 for low prior achievers. 
Table 3.4 presents estimates from models allowing the treatment effect to vary at the 
primary school level. In Panel A, the treatment effect varies between urban and rural 
primary schools. The positive effects of boycott participation on KS2 teacher 
assessments are greater for urban primary schools than rural primary schools. At KS3 
level, the adverse effect of boycott participation exists for pupils who attended rural 
primary schools, but there is a zero effect for pupils who attended urban primary 
schools. Similarly, at KS4 level, the adverse effects of boycott participation are found 




In Panel B, the boycott participation effect is permitted to vary between primary schools 
that were given an ‘Outstanding’ or ‘Good’ overall effectiveness rating by OFSTED 
and those that received a ‘Satisfactory’ or ‘Inadequate’ rating. Primary schools that were 
highly rated by OFSTED did not inflate the KS2 maths teacher assessments for the 
boycott affected cohort, unlike lowly rated primaries. There was evidence of inflation 
in KS2 English teacher assessments in all schools, but this inflation was greater in 
poorly rated schools. A clear pattern exists at KS3 and KS4 level; there is no evidence 
of a boycott participation effect for pupils who attended poorly rated primary schools. 
However, evidence of a negative boycott participation effect is consistently found for 
pupils who attended ‘Outstanding’ or ‘Good’ primary schools. 
Attention turns towards the additional (non-attainment) outcomes investigated. Table 
3.5 investigates the impact of boycott participation on KS4 subject choice. Column (1) 
indicates that pupils were one percentage point less likely to make subject choices that 
were compatible with the English Baccalaureate specification if they were affected by 
the boycott. This equates to 3.3 per cent of the number of pupils in the sample who met 
the EBacc requirements. This effect is statistically significant at the one per cent 
significance level. Column (2) indicates that pupils were 0.6 percentage points less 
likely to enrol in three or more qualifications for STEM subjects. However, this effect 
is only statistically significant at the ten per cent significance level. This equates to 0.8 
per cent of the number of pupils who did enrol in three or more STEM qualifications. 
Column (3) indicates that there is no evidence that pupils were either more likely or less 
likely to study at least one vocational GCSE qualification as a result of being affected 
by the boycott. 
Table 3.6 presents results of the difference-in-difference-in-differences model for 
measures of school absenteeism. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (3) are, 
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respectively, the number of sessions missed in a school year due to overall absence, 
authorised absence and unauthorised absences. The first row of coefficients contains 
the estimated effects of being affected by the boycott on absence during year/grade 5. 
This is the grade immediately before the KS2 SATs tests take place. Therefore, it is 
expected that these coefficients are not statistically different from zero. In grades 7 
onwards (after the KS2 SATs tests should take place), there are negative estimated 
effects of boycott participation on overall absence and authorised absences. This 
indicates that pupils who were affected by the boycott are absent for fewer school 
sessions and that this is driven by fewer authorised absences rather than fewer 
unauthorised absences. However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are 
relatively small. For example, pupils are estimated to miss 0.191 fewer school sessions 
in grade 7 if they were affected by the boycott. This corresponds to 1.1 per cent of the 
average number of sessions missed per school year in the sample. 
3.6.2  Robustness 
The principal identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator is that 
the attainment trends of pupils enrolled in primary schools that participated in the 
boycott is shared with pupils enrolled in non-boycotting primary schools in the absence 
of treatment.  
To test the creditability of this assumption, I add primary school-specific linear cohort 
trends to the baseline model. These trends account for the average growth in outcomes 
of pupils from that school over the entire period, and the parameter of interest now 
represents the deviation from the predicted growth path caused by the boycott 
participation. If the parallel trends assumption holds, then the predicted growth paths 
should not differ systematically between the primary schools that did and did not 
participate in the boycott. This implies that the parameter of interest should be invariant 
 83 
 
to the inclusion of school-specific linear cohort trends. Panel A of Table 3.7 reports 
estimates from the school-specific linear cohort trend augmented model. The estimated 
boycott participation effect on KS3 teacher assessments are the only effects to be 
statistically different from the corresponding estimates from the preferred model at 
conventional significance levels.  
There is a relationship between the quality of the primary and secondary schools 
attended by a pupil. Under the assumption that successive cohorts of pupils leaving 
primary school attend the same secondary schools in the same proportions, then the 
primary school fixed effect adequately captures the average secondary school 
experience of pupils from each primary school. This assumption is strong, however, and 
it is unlikely that the distribution of destinations for primary school leavers is fixed over 
time. If the secondary schools attended by boycott affected pupils systematically 
differed compared to the secondary school destinations of pupils from the same primary 
school in other cohorts, then this could bias the boycott participation estimate.  
While there is no reason to suspect that this may have occurred, this identification threat 
can be dismissed by adding secondary school fixed effects to the model.  By adding 
secondary school fixed effects, the estimated effect is identified by within secondary 
school variation in boycott participation, as well as within primary school variation in 
participation. Panel B of Table 3.7 reports estimates from such an enlarged model. The 
boycott participation effect estimates from this model are nearly identical to those from 
the main model and are estimated with similar precision. The similarity of the estimates 
between models with and without secondary school fixed effects, suggests that the 
mechanism driving these effect is not dependent on the time-invariant characteristics of 
the secondary school attended. 
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The sample includes a cohort of pupils that sat their KS2 tests in the school year after 
the boycott impacted cohort. In this school year, there was no industrial action, and over 
99 per cent of pupils took the tests as expected. If there was a systematic effect of 
participation in the boycott on the primary school in the school years after the school 
year of the boycott, then it is unwise to regard the post-boycott cohort as unaffected by 
the boycott. For example, teachers may notice an observable difference in the behaviour 
of their pupils when the pressure of SATs tests is lifted by the boycott and may decide 
to place less emphasis on the tests in the future. If persistent boycott participation effects 
exist within primary schools, then this will bias the boycott participation effect for the 
affected cohort downwards if the persistent boycott participation effect on future 
cohorts is positive, and vice-versa. Panel C of Table 3.7 details estimates form a model 
estimated on a reduced sample excluding the 2010/11 cohort. The boycott participation 
effect estimates are again almost identical to the estimates of the main model.  
When DiD is applied to repeated cross-sectional data, then the parallel trends 
assumption is necessary but not sufficient. The composition of the pupils in the 
treatment group must not systematically vary over time relative to pupils in the control 
group. Such compositional variations may confound the estimated treatment effect. 
For each pupil, I calculate the mean of several pupil characteristics for their primary 
school cohort excluding themselves. These primary school cohort means are then added 
to the main model to control for the effects of observable variation in the composition 
of primary school cohorts over the school years. I calculate primary school cohort 
“means but one” for all included pupil control variables, except month of birth 
indicators. The boycott participation effect estimated from a model including these 
cohort variables are presented in Panel D of Table 3.7. Again, the coefficient estimates 
are very similar. Adverse effects of boycott participation on KS4 English and KS4 
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maths were estimated in the main model but lacked precision, but they are estimated 
with suitable precision in Panel D to be statistically different from zero at the five per 
cent significance level. 
A school-level DiD model applied to the matched sample is used to formally test 
whether the composition of the affected cohort in boycotting primary schools 
systematically differs to these primary schools’ other cohorts. The effect of boycott 
participation is estimated on ten different pupil characteristics averaged over each 
school’s year six cohort. Effect estimates are presented in Table 3.8. For most of these 
characteristics, there is no difference between the treated and untreated cohorts of 
boycotting primary schools. Although, the treated cohort of boycotting primary schools 
are estimated to have lower levels of prior (KS1) attainment than untreated cohorts of 
these schools (columns (8) to (10)). However, the economic significance of the effect 
estimates is limited. One national curriculum level translates into six points. Therefore, 
the estimated difference in the prior maths attainment between the treated and untreated 
cohorts (of boycotting primary schools) is equivalent to 1 in 70 pupils receiving one 
national curriculum level lower. Given the limited magnitude of the effect size, it is 
argued that this does not present a worrisome identification threat. 
3.7 Potential mechanisms 
The preceding section presented robust evidence of a small adverse boycott 
participation effect on age fourteen teacher assessment attainment as well as age sixteen 
secondary school qualifications attainment. Attention now turns towards explaining 
why these effects are found.  
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Potential mechanisms can be categorised as occurring within primary schools or 
secondary schools. Alternatively, in equivalent chronological terms, mechanisms can 
operate before or during the boycott, or they can function post-boycott. 
There are two potential primary school mechanisms: 1) not preparing, or revising, for 
the test as pupils might have done in the absence of the boycott, 2) not gaining as much 
experience of high stake formal examinations as pupils who did complete KS2 SATs. 
The salience of the first potential mechanism crucially depends on when schools 
stopped preparing for the SATs. I earlier argued that boycotting primary schools were 
unlikely to stop teaching to the test until late in the school year. It is possible that 
changes in test preparation in the two-week lead between the unions calling for 
industrial action and the tests taking place contribute to the estimated effects. Teaching 
to the test and revising for the test may be useful ways of learning, or at least good ways 
of learning the tested material. This will benefit future attainment if primary and 
secondary school curriculums are well aligned (as the National Curriculum intends). 
Practising completing high stakes formal examinations is beneficial if exams measure 
exam skills as well as knowledge and understanding of the testable content. This is 
likely to be true. This mechanism is unlikely to explain the adverse boycott participation 
effect on KS3 teacher assessments – a measure of attainment which should not depend 
on exam skills. Furthermore, when the pupils in this sample were at school, GCSE 
qualifications were modular meaning that pupils would have sat very many 
examinations during KS4. Given that pupils sit many exams at secondary school, the 




Having discussed potential primary school mechanisms, I now discuss three potential 
secondary school mechanisms. The first relates to secondary school qualification grade 
targets. An important metric for secondary schools, and their teachers, is the percentage 
of their pupils who are deemed to have made the level of progress expected of them 
between KS2 and KS4 in English and maths. This success rate features prominently in 
secondary school league tables. A pupil has made expected progress if the ‘gain’ 
between their KS2 test grade and their KS4 GCSE grade is sufficiently large. For 
example, a pupil awarded grade (or level) 4 on their KS2 English SATs test, would be 
considered as having made expected progress if they secured a grade C in GCSE 
English. Whereas, a pupil who is awarded level 3 on their KS2 maths SATs test, would 
only be required to achieve a grade D at GCSE to have made expected progress.  
Pupils affected by the boycott do not have SATs test levels. The levels awarded to these 
pupils on KS2 teacher assessments were used instead. Teacher assessments are 
inherently a more subjective measure of attainment than externally marked tests and are 
usually overstated relative to KS2 test data, plus the results section shows that teacher 
assessments were inflated because of the boycott. Table 3.9 shows using a difference-
in-difference model that the KS2 maths (Column (1)) and English (Column (2)) level 
used as the baseline measure of attainment for expected progress calculations was 
inflated for boycott affected pupils. This means that boycott affected pupils would have 
to achieve better grades in GCSE English and maths to be considered as having made 
the expected level of progress than if they were not affected by the boycott.  
If secondary schools wish to maximise their expected progress success rates, then they 
should reallocate their effort from pupils with boycott-induced high (difficult to obtain) 
expected progress related GCSE targets to non-boycott affected pupils for whom it 
should be easier to achieve the expected progress GCSE targets. Columns (3) and (4) 
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of Table 3.9 show that boycott affected pupils were indeed less likely to make the  
progress expected of them in English and maths. 
The heterogeneity analysis indicated that the adverse effects at KS3 and KS4 are greater 
for high prior ability pupils. This pattern is consistent with the expected progress 
mechanism. Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of pupils achieving expected progress by 
KS2 attainment. Expected progress in maths and English is shown to be easier to 
achieve for more able pupils. Therefore, secondary schools that wish to maximise their 
expected progress success rates are likely to be focus on high ability pupils rather than 
low ability pupils. If the boycott induced secondary school teachers to reallocate their 
effort, then it is more likely to be reallocated from high ability boycott affected pupils 
to high ability non-boycott affected pupils. 
Two further secondary school, or post-boycott, mechanisms are that missing KS2 test 
data: 1) significantly affected the ability of secondary schools to stream pupils by 
ability, and 2) impaired the ability of parents to gauge their child’s attainment, and thus 
lessened the allocative efficiency of parental inputs. However, a compelling argument 
against these propositions is that KS2 test data is just one of many available signals of 
pupil attainment and ability. Secondary schools and parents could draw upon KS2 
teacher assessment data in place of KS2 test data for affected pupils. A common practice 
in English secondary schools is to run formative assessment tests (particularly in the 
entry-year). These tests, as well as teacher observation and reporting, could be used to 
stream pupils and to inform parents about their child’s progress. 
3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates whether there is a private benefit or cost to pupils from their 
own participation in mandatory standardised tests on their future teacher assessment 
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and secondary school qualification attainment, independent of the existing school 
accountability arrangements. 
Industrial action by head teachers in the form of a widespread, but hastily called, boycott 
of the 2010 KS2 SATs test is exploited as a natural experiment. I find evidence that 
pupils who were prevented from participating in the age eleven SATs tests by the 
boycott were assessed to be working at a lower level than their peers by their teachers 
at age fourteen. The GCSE maths attainment of boycott affected pupils are estimated to 
be 0.019 standard deviations lower than unaffected pupils. These findings provide 
evidence that there is a small private benefit to pupils from participation in mandatory 
standardised tests.  
However, this private attainment benefit, may not arise through enhanced human capital 
accumulation. The chapter demonstrates that as a side effect of boycott participation, 
pupils are set artificially high secondary school expected progress targets. It is 
speculated that since secondary schools are incentivised to maximise their expected 
progress success rates, teacher effort may be reallocated away from boycott affected 
pupils to pupils without inflated expected progress targets. Other potential mechanisms 
exist, and arguments in their favour are evaluated. 
Separately, evidence is also reported that the boycott reduced the likelihood a pupil 
selected secondary school qualifications that were compatible with the English 
Baccalaureate. Boycott participation is also shown to slightly reduce the number of 
school sessions missed due to unauthorised absences.  
90 
 
Figure 3.1: Proportion of cohort unexpectedly without a valid mark in KS2 English 
and maths 
Notes: bar represents the proportion of the corresponding school year’s year six cohorts 




Figure 3.2: Estimated propensity score of boycott participation 
Notes: propensity score is estimated using a Probit model. The included time-invariant school 
characteristics are: urban setting indicator; local authority-controlled school indicator; indicators 
for the school’s most recent Ofsted Overall Effectiveness rating and local authority fixed effects. 
The included school-cohort characteristics are: proportion of school cohort that has white ethnicity; 
proportion of school cohort that is female; proportion of school cohort that speaks English as their 
first language; proportion of school cohort that is eligible for free school meals; average prior 
attainment as measured separately by KS1 English, maths and science teacher assessments; school 
size; cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio. These characteristics are included separately for each pre-





Figure 3.3: Estimated difference in trends between boycotting and non-boycotting 
primary schools for Key Stage 2 teacher assessment outcomes 
Notes: filled shape represents the point estimate of the difference in outcomes between pupils who 
attended boycotting primary schools (treatment group) and non-boycotting primaries (control 
group) relative to the 2003/04 cohort (conditional on a common cohort (time) effect). Vertical lines 
indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. All specifications include cohort (time) effects, school 
fixed effects, student characteristics and prior attainment as measured by KS1 teacher assessment. 
Student characteristics are: female, white ethnicity, FSM eligible, English is first language, cohort 





Figure 3.4: Estimated difference in trends between boycotting and non-boycotting 
primary schools for Key Stage 3 teacher assessment outcomes 
 
Notes: filled shape represents the point estimate of the difference in outcomes between pupils who 
attended boycotting primary schools (treatment group) and non-boycotting primaries (control 
group) relative to the 2003/04 cohort (conditional on a common cohort (time) effect). Vertical lines 
indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. All specifications include cohort (time) effects, school 
fixed effects, student characteristics and prior attainment as measured by KS1 teacher assessment. 
Student characteristics are: female, white ethnicity, FSM eligible, English is first language, cohort 





Figure 3.5: Estimated difference in trends between boycotting and non-boycotting 
primary schools for Key Stage 4 outcomes (part 1) 
 
Notes: filled shape represents the point estimate of the difference in outcomes between pupils who 
attended boycotting primary schools (treatment group) and non-boycotting primaries (control 
group) relative to the 2003/04 cohort (conditional on a common cohort (time) effect). Vertical lines 
indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. All specifications include cohort (time) effects, school 
fixed effects, student characteristics and prior attainment as measured by KS1 teacher assessment. 
Student characteristics are: female, white ethnicity, FSM eligible, English is first language, cohort 




Figure 3.6: Estimated difference in trends between boycotting and non-boycotting 
primary schools for Key Stage 4 outcomes (part 2) 
 
Notes: filled shape represents the point estimate of the difference in outcomes between pupils who 
attended boycotting primary schools (treatment group) and non-boycotting primaries (control 
group) relative to the 2003/04 cohort (conditional on a common cohort (time) effect). Vertical lines 
indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. All specifications include cohort (time) effects, school 
fixed effects, student characteristics and prior attainment as measured by KS1 teacher assessment. 
Student characteristics are: female, white ethnicity, FSM eligible, English is first language, cohort 




Figure 3.7: Percentage of pupils who achieve the expected level of progress between 
KS4 and KS2 in English and maths by KS2 attainment 
Notes: calculated using data on the year six cohorts of 2005/06 to 2008/09. “B” denotes pupils who 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Impact of Low Stakes Standardised Test Grades 
on Subsequent School Outcomes 
Standardised tests often facilitate school accountability, and pupils usually receive 
grades (or other forms of feedback) based on their test performance. However, 
providing feedback to pupils is not necessary for school accountability purposes. This 
chapter evaluates the effect of receiving integer grades based on a series of low-stakes 
standardised tests taken by eleven-year-olds in England. The chapter uses raw test 
marks, typically unobserved by pupils, and grade thresholds to implement a sharp 
regression discontinuity design. The results indicate that just passing the cut-off to 
achieve a higher grade in these tests leads to an improvement in secondary school 
qualification attainment. The estimated effect of just crossing a grade cut-off on 
secondary school attainment is typically larger for economically disadvantaged pupils. 





Standardised testing has become commonplace in schools as policymakers across the 
globe introduce test-based school accountability systems. If there are consequences for 
school-level or class-level test performance, then two pervasive principal-agent 
problems can be mitigated. The first is the inability of parents to observe the teaching 
quality of a school directly. The second is the lack of information on teacher effort 
available to head teachers. The prevailing consensus in the literature is that introducing 
test-based accountability improves the attainment of pupils (Figlio and Loeb, 2011).1 
Indeed, recent work suggests the pressures of test-based accountability can lead to 
higher college participation rates and improved earnings for pupils (Deming et al., 
2016). 
If the purpose of a standardised test is to provide data for an accountability system, then 
there is no requirement to give pupils any feedback on their achievement in the tests. 
However, standardised tests, such as those used in England’s primary school 
accountability system, often purportedly serve both a summative and a formative 
function. These standardised tests are intended to provide parents with information 
about their child’s attainment and assist teachers with their planning for their pupils’ 
subsequent learning (Whetton, 2009). Without this function, parental opposition to the 
testing of seven and eleven-year-olds might prove politically inhibitive. 
The inclusion of the formative function implicitly assumes that providing pupils with 
feedback on their standardised test performance is useful and harmless. However, if 
standardised test performance measures a mere subset of meaningful attainment at 
school or is an otherwise noisy attainment measure, then performance feedback is likely 
                                                 
1 Albeit achievement on standardised tests usually defines attainment, which may measure a mere subset 
of desirable skills and knowledge. 
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to provide limited insight to pupils, their parents and teachers. Furthermore, if 
performance feedback is coarse, misleading, or prone to misinterpretation, then 
incorrect inferences may be drawn about a pupil’s progress to date. Future decisions 
taken by pupils, their parents and teachers based on these inferences may differ from 
those made with accurate information about attainment to date. In other words, the 
assumption that feedback is beneficial is not trivial. 
This chapter evaluates the consequences of the feedback arrangements for a series of 
standardised tests sat by eleven-year-olds in England’s state-funded schools between 
the late 1980s and 2015. Specifically, this chapter investigates whether the feedback 
influenced school attendance immediately after the standardised tests and attainment on 
important secondary school qualifications (GCSEs – General Certificates of Secondary 
Education – and their equivalents) five years subsequent. 
Under the feedback arrangements in question, pupils were typically unaware of their 
raw mark on the standardised tests but instead received feedback in the form of a 
discrete numerical grade. Over 94 per cent of pupils received either a ‘level 3’, ‘level 
4’ or ‘level 5’ grade, which respectively denotes achievement below, at or above the 
nationally expected standard for their age. Raw test mark thresholds, unknown by both 
pupils and markers, exclusively determined which grade each pupil achieved in each 
subject. These arrangements meant that, in the region of these thresholds, a pupil who 
scored one mark higher than an otherwise similar pupil could receive markedly different 
feedback about their progress at school to date. Similarly, a pupil who scores just 
enough marks to pass the threshold to receive the grade denoting attainment at the 
expected standard would receive identical feedback to another who narrowly falls short 
of the mark threshold to achieve the grade representing attainment above that standard. 
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This chapter combines data on the raw marks scored by pupils on the standardised tests 
with knowledge of the grade thresholds to implement a sharp regression discontinuity 
design. This methodology disentangles the effect of marginally passing the mark 
threshold to receive a grade (henceforth referred to as a ‘grade feedback effect’) from 
underlying achievement on that test for pupils who scored close to the grade threshold.  
This chapter finds evidence that pupils who just pass the age eleven English language 
test mark cut-off for the grade denoting attainment above the expected standard perform 
two per cent of a standard deviation better in their English language secondary school 
qualifications. Those who just pass the maths test mark cut-off for the grade 
representing attainment at the expected standard perform 3.6 per cent of a standard 
deviation better in their maths secondary school qualifications. Both effects are 
statistically different from zero at the one per cent significance level. While small, these 
effects nonetheless indicate that the age eleven standardised tests are not unambiguously 
“no stakes” for pupils, as performance feedback influences pupils’ subsequent 
attainment. There is no evidence of an effect on school attendance during the school 
year following the standardised test, leading to speculation that the mechanism of the 
effect on attainment is not through pupil effort, at least not at the extensive margin. 
Further analysis reveals that the grade feedback effect varies by pupils’ socioeconomic 
circumstances. For economically advantaged pupils the estimated effect on English 
language secondary school qualification achievement of grade feedback on the English 
language standardised tests is precisely zero. However, for economically disadvantaged 
pupils, there are modest positive returns to just passing the English language test cut-
off for the grades denoting performance at the expected standard and above the expected 
standard; 2.9 per cent and 6.6 per cent of a standard deviation respectively. Both 
estimates are statistically significant at the one per cent level. For maths, there is 
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evidence of a positive effect on maths secondary school qualification achievement of 
crossing the test mark cut-off for the expected standard grade for both groups of pupils. 
The point estimates are larger and more precise for disadvantaged pupils, but the 
differences between the groups are not statistically significant. 
Not only does this indicate that age eleven standardised test grades polarise subsequent 
high-stakes secondary school exam performance, but also that there is a socioeconomic 
gradient in this effect. Pupils who fall just short of the English language test mark cut-
off for a better grade will perform less well in important English language secondary 
school qualifications if they are economically disadvantaged, but not if they are 
economically advantaged. As such, the results of this chapter speak to the literature on 
how socioeconomic gaps in educational achievement accumulate (Anders, 2012; 
Chowdry et al., 2013). Other heterogeneity analysis finds statistically significant 
feedback effects among white pupils but is unable to estimate a precise effect among 
non-white pupils. 
That two pupils who are identical in all aspects other than that the first scored a single 
mark below a grade threshold while the other scored one mark more will have, on 
average, different outcomes in high stakes examinations suggest that the age eleven 
standardised tests are not indeed low-stakes from the pupil perspective. Furthermore, it 
is undesirable that this effect be far stronger for socioeconomically disadvantaged pupils 
than for all other pupils. This implies the stakes are higher for the disadvantaged group, 
which is troubling since that by age eleven they will have already fallen behind their 
more advantaged peers on average. 
The findings of this chapter do not suggest that providing feedback on standardised test 
performance impairs human capital accumulation. However, the findings do indicate 
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that it is necessary to consider the nature of standardised test feedback provided to 
pupils. It should be a concern to policymakers that grades awarded on a purportedly low 
stakes standardised test series influence pupils’ achievement in high stakes secondary 
school qualifications five years later. There are many factors outside of the control of 
pupils that can impact attainment on a single standardised test. 
For example, primary schools will adopt a variety of approaches to test preparation; 
some will intensively prepare for the standardised tests, whereas other head teachers 
will feel less need to focus intensively on the test. A second factor is that pupils cannot 
be confident how markers will interpret their potential answers; this is particularly true 
in the English language standardised tests, which include long-form answers where 
there is more subjectivity in the marking process than in maths. Finally, there is, of 
course, an element of good or bad luck behind every academic test result. If the pupil 
has the potential to score near a grade threshold in the standardised test, then having 
good luck will not only mean they achieve a higher grade on that test but also that they 
will achieve more in secondary school qualifications five years later. This is not a 
characteristic of a system that offers every pupil the same opportunity to reach his or 
her potential. 
4.2 Institutional Background 
Compulsory schooling typically lasts for twelve years in England. Pupils usually begin 
the reception grade at age four or five. Grades one to eleven follows reception. Grade 
retention is rare, so pupils finish compulsory schooling in the year they turn sixteen2. 
                                                 
2 Since 2015 pupils in England must, until the age of eighteen, either continue in full-time education, 
combine part-time education with part-time work/volunteering or enrol in a study at work scheme. 
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Pupils complete reception and grades one to six in a primary school and the remaining 
grades in a secondary school. 
The introduction of the national curriculum in 1989 split grades one to eleven into four 
Key Stages (KS). KS1 spans grades one and two; KS2 covers grades three to six; KS3 
extends across grades seven to nine, while KS4 covers the final two grades of secondary 
school. When the government introduced the curriculum, ministers decided to assess 
pupil attainment at the end of each KS to judge how effectively schools were delivering 
it. National Curriculum Assessments (NCAs) are the mechanism for measuring 
achievement. For the cohort studied in this chapter, NCAs included externally marked 
standardised tests at the end of KS2; informally and more commonly known as SATs 
tests. NCAs also consist of externally moderated teacher assessments at the end of KS1, 
KS2 and KS3. Achievement in nationally recognised secondary school qualifications 
(typically GCSEs – General Certificates of Secondary Education) represents attainment 
at the end of KS4. 
Pupils complete KS2 SATs tests in the final term of primary school, which comprises 
a series of English and maths tests. There are three maths tests: a test to be completed 
with a calculator, another to be attempted without and a mental arithmetic test. The 
English tests include a reading test, a long-form writing test and a short-form writing 
test (which also assesses spelling).  
The testing authority maps the total raw mark for the series of tests for each subject onto 
National Curriculum Levels (henceforth referred to as levels) by setting several cut-off 
points throughout the total raw mark distribution. The cut-off points vary slightly year 
upon year. Levels range from 1 to 8, and themselves correspond to broad subject-
specific descriptors of attainment. Teacher assessments at KS1 to KS3 are also 
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denominated using levels. Pupils are expected to be working at level 2 at the end of KS1 
and to progress between each key stage at a rate equivalent to two levels. Therefore, the 
expectation is that pupils achieve level 4 and level 6 at the end of KS2 and KS3 
respectively.  Pupils and parents are aware of these expectations. The template produced 
by the Department for Education (DfE) for schools to report KS2 SATs test results 
explicitly states that level 3 ‘represents achievement below the nationally expected 
standard’, level 4 ‘represents achievement at the nationally expected standard’, and 
level 5 ‘represents achievement above the nationally expected standard’. 
Pupils can be awarded levels 2 to 5 based on their achievement in the KS2 SATs tests. 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of levels in English and maths across pupils who sat 
the tests in May 2009. Three per cent of pupils are recorded as working below the level 
assessed by the English tests (3.5 per cent for the maths tests). These pupils have gained 
exemption from sitting the tests which is at their head teacher’s discretion3. Pupils who 
are recorded as not being awarded a level sit the test but do not perform well enough to 
be awarded level 2.  
The KS2 SATs tests are designed to be accessible for pupils working towards levels 2 
to 5; therefore, it is unsurprising fewer than two per cent of pupils are awarded level 2 
or no level in the English and maths tests. Approximately fifteen per cent of pupils are 
awarded level 3 in the English and maths tests. The most commonly awarded level is 
level 4; 45 per cent of pupils are awarded it in English and 52 per cent in maths. 
However, a sizeable proportion of pupils receive the highest available level; just over a 
third of pupils in English and 29 per cent in maths.  
                                                 
3 Head teachers do not need to ask for permission to make a pupil exempt from the SATs tests, but they 
must justify their decision in a report copied to the pupil’s parents and the chair of the school’s governing 
body. Parents have the right of appeal. 
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Table 4.2 characterises the distribution of levels across different subgroups of pupils. 
Roughly the same proportion of free school meal (FSM) eligible and ineligible pupils 
achieve level 4 in English and maths, but FSM eligible pupils are approximately twice 
as likely to receive the level 3 grade, and half as likely to receive the level 5 grade. In 
English, girls are less likely to receive the level 2 and level 3 grades and are much more 
likely to be graded level 5 relative to boys. However, in maths, girls are more likely to 
receive grades level 2 and level 3 than boys. Girls are also less likely to achieve the top 
grade than boys are. Although, overall gender differences are smaller in maths than in 
English. Regarding differences between ethnicities, white pupils relative to non-white 
pupils are marginally less likely to be graded level 2, and more likely to be graded level 
3. There is little variation between the two groups regarding achieving level 4. 
External markers mark the tests. Markers typically do not mark more than one type of 
test and do not know the raw mark threshold for each level – the testing authority does 
not set this in advance of the marking process. As such, there is limited scope for raw 
marks to be manipulated such that pupils do not fall narrowly short of any level 
threshold. The DfE advises primary schools not to report total raw test marks to pupils. 
However, parents can access this data through data protection legislation.  
Compliance with the statutory obligation to complete the tests is generally high. Despite 
opposition to SATs tests from some, but not all, teacher unions, schools do not refuse 
to administer them – with the notable exception of the 2010 boycott studied in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, unlike in some US states, there is not a substantial 
parent-led protest movement against SATs tests, in which parents withdraw their 
children from schools during test days. 
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Pupils learn which levels they have achieved in their SATs tests and their internal 
teacher assessments at the end of the school year in which they complete the tests. The 
tests are notionally low stakes from the pupils’ perspective as their primary function is 
to facilitate the assessment of school-level performance. The KS2 SATs tests do not 
influence which secondary school pupils attend. Both expressions of secondary school 
preferences by parents and allocations of places by the local authority take place well 
before pupils sit KS2 SATs tests. KS2 SATs tests are also not used to determine whether 
a child is offered a place at one of England’s few remaining academically selective 
grammar schools. 
However, secondary schools are given information on the KS2 SATs test performance 
of incoming pupils by their primary schools. There is a lack of nationally representative 
data on how English schools assign pupils to class groups, although both ‘setting’ and 
‘streaming’ are thought to be prevalent in English secondary schools. Setting refers to 
schools grouping pupils into subject-specific classes based on their apparent ability in 
that subject; whereas streaming is when schools group pupils into classes fixed across 
many subjects based on their perceived level of general ability. SATs test data is the 
only ability signal always available to secondary schools when pupils join from primary 
school. SATs test performance may, therefore, be consequential for class assignment, 
and thus the composition of within secondary school peer groups.  
On the other hand, secondary schools are known to treat KS2 SATs test data with 
suspicion. The prevailing wisdom among secondary teachers is that KS2 SATs test 
performance is heavily dependent on the primary school pupils attended. Not only is 
there variation in the effectiveness of primary schools, but there is also variation in the 
emphasis primaries place on securing good KS2 SATs test performance. Some primary 
schools rigorously prepare for KS2 SATs tests, whereas others barely acknowledge 
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their existence and adopt a more holistic approach to teaching. Furthermore, secondaries 
will quickly accumulate additional data on the ability of their incoming pupils. Over 
two-thirds of English secondaries are known to use cognitive ability tests (CATs) at the 
point of admission. As such, it is likely KS2 SATs test performance has a minimal 
impact on class assignment particularly beyond the first term of secondary school. 
A more likely reason why KS2 SATs tests are not truly low stakes for pupils is the 
unequivocal link between the levels awarded for KS2 SATs tests and GCSE 
achievement targets. At the time that this chapter’s sample completed secondary school, 
the government’s preferred, and headline, measure of secondary school pupil progress 
(and thus secondary school effectiveness) was the school-level percentage of pupils 
‘who make progress expected of them’ in English and maths (Leckie and Goldstein, 
2017).  
What constitutes expected progress for a pupil is determined solely by the level they 
received in their KS2 SATs tests. For example, a pupil awarded level 4 on their English 
KS2 SATs test is deemed to have progressed as expected if they achieve a C grade or 
better in GCSE English and is deemed not to have made sufficient progress if they 
achieve a D grade or worse. Similarly, a pupil awarded level 5 on their English KS2 
SATs test must achieve a B grade or better at GCSE level to be recorded as having made 
expected progress. 
The expected progress metric effectively places a lower limit on GCSE English and 
maths target grades. Schools must strive for as many of their pupils as possible to be 
deemed as having made expected progress, even if other available information suggests 
that what constitutes expected progress is unrealistic. As the expected progress measure 
featured prominently in school league tables, schools closely monitored their expected 
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progress rate. As such, secondary schools and their teachers are acutely aware of each 
pupil’s KS2 SATs test levels.  
4.3 Literature Review 
In recent years, a literature has emerged investigating the causal effect of narrowly 
passing certain grade (or other feedback) thresholds in test scores on subsequent 
educational outcomes. The literature predominantly considers the effects of just 
achieving a ‘pass’ grade (relative to just falling short of a pass grade) on high school 
exit exams (HSEE) on outcomes such as high school graduation, choice of major, 
college enrolment and time to degree completion. This review briefly summarises 
notable international contributions before discussing three papers using English data. 
Partly due to the No Child Left Behind Act, most US states require their high school 
students to pass state-mandated tests to receive their high school diploma. Several 
papers have used a regression discontinuity design to compare outcomes between 
students who narrowly achieve a pass grade on their HSEEs and those that narrowly fall 
short of passing. The first, Martorell (2004), studied the impacts of the Texan exit exam 
on a sample of students from the 1990s and found no effect on early high school dropout 
behaviour but did find evidence of reduced post-secondary attainment. Similarly, 
Reardon et al. (2010) find no evidence of an effect of narrowly crossing the pass 
threshold on California’s HSEEs on various high school outcomes.  
However, using data from New Jersey, Ou (2010) finds that students who just fall short 
of a HSSE pass grade cut-off were more likely to drop out than those who just meet the 
cut-off. The estimated effect is largest for the maths exam. Effects are also more 
pronounced for economically disadvantaged and ethnic minority students. Papay et al. 
(2010) report that just falling short of the pass threshold on a first attempt at the English 
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or maths HSEE does not affect the average Massachusetts student’s probability of 
graduating. Although low-income urban students who narrowly fall short of the pass 
grade threshold for the maths HSEE have an eight-percentage-point lower graduation 
rate than similar students who narrowly crossed the same threshold. This is sizable 
given that the graduation rate is 74 per cent for the latter group. The difference in the 
findings of Martorell (2004) and Reardon et al. (2010), and those of Ou (2010) and 
Papay et al. (2010), could be a result of variation in the nature of the tests, the relative 
‘difficulty’ of achieving a pass grade and the student population (Papay et al., 2014). 
The literature also considers post-high school outcomes. Students who narrowly fall 
short of the pass grade threshold in Massachusetts HSEEs are between seven to sixteen 
per cent less likely to enrol in college within two years of their cohort’s high school 
graduation (Papay et al., 2014). Narrowly meeting the pass grade threshold in the 
French national HSEE leads to an improvement in average college peer quality of 
around 13 per cent of a standard deviation (as measured by HSEE attainment) and an 
increase in the likelihood of enrolment in a postsecondary STEM institution by between 
19 and 24 percentage points (Canaan and Mouganie, 2018). 
Whereas the papers above consider the impacts of narrowly meeting the pass grade 
threshold on HSEEs, Papay et al. (2016) investigate the impact of passing grade 
thresholds on low-stakes tests that have no official consequences for students. The 
authors find that, for urban low-income students, narrowly passing the test mark score 
cut-off for a grade with positive connotations increases the probability of attending 
college. The effect is greatest among students who previously reported they did not plan 
to attend a four-year college. These findings are surprising given that students are aware 




The Advanced Placement (AP) programme in the US offers a college-level curriculum 
to high achieving high school students; and uses examinations to assess participants’ 
attainment. Participants do not know their raw exam score, but they receive an integer 
grade from 1 to 5 denoting increasing levels of proficiency. Narrowly crossing the raw 
exam score threshold for an integer grade that grants college credits increases the 
probability of completing a bachelor’s degree within four years of high school 
graduation (Smith et al., 2016). Just passing the exam score cut-off to obtain a higher 
integer grade for an AP exam also increases the probability that a student will major in 
that exam subject at college by five per cent (Avery et al., 2017).  
A small number of papers consider the effect of narrowly crossing grade thresholds in 
the context of English schools. While this chapter considers the effect of just surpassing 
KS2 SATs test grade cut-offs, Alcott (2017) investigates the effect of just crossing KS3 
SATs test grade cut-offs on GCSE attainment and enrolment in A-level and University 
degree courses. The paper uses Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England 
(LSYPE) data, which follows 15,770 young people between the ages of 14 and 25. The 
LSYPE sample attempted KS3 SATs tests in 2004. KS3 SATs tests were abolished after 
2008, but the marking and feedback arrangements were directly comparable to those of 
the KS2 SATs tests studied in this chapter. Adopting a sharp regression discontinuity 
design, the paper reports evidence that just passing the threshold to obtain the English 
grade denoting the expected attainment standard has a positive effect on subsequent 
GCSE attainment, and enrolment in both A-level and University courses for pupils with 
low socio-economic status; whereas there is no pattern of effects for mid- and high 
socio-economic status pupils. 
Using the same dataset, Sartarelli (2011) investigates the impact of just surpassing grade 
thresholds on KS2 SATs tests in English, maths and science on a range of self-reported 
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behaviours. The research suggests obtaining the level 4 grade does not have a 
meaningful impact on pupil behaviour as measured by outcomes such as the likelihood 
of playing truant, being suspended or permanently excluded from school, or receiving 
a police caution. Both Sartarelli (2011) and Alcott (2017) are frustrated by the LSYPE 
dataset whose small sample size constrains the precision of effect estimates. LSYPE 
also suffers from severe sample attrition which limits the external validity of the 
findings. 
More recent work by Machin et al. (2018) explores the effect of just passing the mark 
threshold for a crucial GCSE grade on post-schooling outcomes. They use a unique 
dataset on the marks achieved during assessments for a GCSE English language 
qualification before pupils have the opportunity to appeal as an instrument for whether 
the pupil achieves a C grade at GCSE – a partial fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
(Battistin and Rettore, 2008). The authors find that narrowly falling short of the C grade 
threshold in English language: reduces the likelihood of enrolling in a higher-level 
qualification by nine percentage points; increases the probability of dropping out of 
education by age eighteen by four percentage points, and raises the likelihood of being 
not in education, training or employment by two percentage points. The paper provides 
suggestive evidence on the potential mechanism; failing to achieve the C grade appears 
to limit the scope of courses and institutions that individuals can subsequently attend. 
4.4 Data 
This chapter uses an extract from the DfE’s National Pupil Database (NPD). The NPD 
is a collection of linked administrative datasets providing detailed information on 
England’s state schools and their pupils. The School Census links pupils to the school 
they attend at a given day once per school term. It additionally contains rich 
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demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, first language, as well as month and 
year of birth. Proxy variables including current and historical eligibility for FSM capture 
socioeconomic circumstances. Researchers can directly match the School Census data 
to pupils’ attainment records for each key stage. 
The extract contains data on the full cohort of pupils who completed KS4 in a state-
funded school in England during the 2013/14 academic year. Most of these pupils 
completed KS2 in the 2008/09 academic year and thus sat KS2 SATs tests in the 
summer term of 2009. I only include pupils who sat this series of SATs tests in the 
analysis. Out of the 562,570 pupils recorded as completing secondary school in 
2013/14, 535,896 (95.25 per cent) were registered to complete both the English and 
maths KS2 SATs in 2009/09. 
The analysis does not use data on earlier cohorts since before the summer 2009 test 
season the testing authority practised ‘borderlining’. Borderlining is the policy of re-
marking all test papers for a subject in which the pupil fell three marks below the level 
boundaries. Remarking did not take place outside of this range. The immediate 
consequence of this practice is that the frequency of test scores dips three marks before 
the threshold and rises straight after. More importantly, however, borderlining 
effectively disturbs the discrete nature of the grade assignment mechanism. Markers 
who are remarking papers because of borderlining are likely to internalise that a pupil 
has narrowly fallen short of a threshold and thus might be inclined to be more generous 
in their marking to ensure that the pupil achieves the higher grade. Indeed, when the 
testing authority discontinued the borderlining procedure, the government attributed the 
fall in the rate of pupils achieving level 4 to this effect (DCSF, 2009). 
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I use total marks scored on the set of KS2 SATs English tests and math tests to calculate 
the distance in marks to the mark threshold to be awarded level 4 and level 5. Therefore, 
these variables are negative if the pupil failed to achieve the level 4 (5) threshold, zero 
if the pupil exactly achieved the threshold and positive if the pupil surpassed the 
threshold. These four variables are the set of running variables used in the regression 
discontinuity design. Zero corresponds to the treatment assignment cut-off for each 
running variable. 
The outcome variables include measures of school attainment and attendance after the 
KS2 SATs tests. Attainment is measured by achievement in secondary school 
qualifications (GCSEs and equivalents). The NPD records the letter grades that pupils 
achieve in a range of qualifications (including both English and maths). GCSEs are 
graded from A* to G which are mapped to a point score from 58 to 16 with one GCSE 
grade worth six points. The DfE maps grades achieved in other qualifications onto a 
point score on the same scale. The attainment outcome variables are the point score in 
GCSE English and maths (separately) and the point score total from the pupils’ best 
eight GCSE or equivalent qualifications. I standardise these variables such that they 
have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. 
The attendance outcome variable is the number of school sessions that a pupil missed 
during the seventh grade (the grade immediately after the KS2 SATs tests). There are 
two sessions per school day, and the legal minimum length of the school year is 190 
school days (380 sessions). The pupils in the sample missed on average 15.9 sessions 




This chapter aims to estimate the causal effects of achieving level 4 and level 5 in KS2 
SATs tests in English and maths on subsequent GCSE attainment and school 
attendance. For simplicity, this section frames the discussion of the econometric 
approach in the context of estimating the causal effect of achieving level 4 in the KS2 
SATs maths test. The methodology, as well as the underpinning institutional features, 
are common to all subjects and levels investigated. 
Consider the following potential outcomes formulation. Treatment is being awarded 
level 4 or above in the KS2 SATs maths tests. 𝐷𝑖 is a binary indicator denoting treatment 
status, it is valued at 1 if the pupil is treated and 0 otherwise. Let 𝑌𝑖0 and 𝑌𝑖1 denote the 
exhaustive set of potential outcomes for pupil 𝑖: 𝑌𝑖0 is the outcome when the pupil is 
awarded level 2 or 3 for maths and 𝑌𝑖1 is the outcome given that the pupil is awarded 
level 4 or 5 in maths. Neither 𝑌𝑖1 or 𝑌𝑖0 can be simultaneously observed meaning the 
treatment effect for pupil 𝑖 (𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0) is also unobserved. Instead 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖𝑌𝑖1 +
(1 − 𝐷𝑖)𝑌𝑖0 is observed. 
Assignment to treatment is a deterministic function of an observable running variable 
(𝑋𝑖), which in this case is the distance between the pupil’s total KS2 maths SATs test 
score and the minimum score required to receive level 4 or above. A pupil is in the 
treatment group (𝐷𝑖 = 1) if this distance is greater than or equal to the cut-off value 
(𝑐), which is set at zero for all pupils. Pupils are untreated (𝐷𝑖 = 0) if the distance 
variable is less than the cut-off value. The treatment assignment rule is perfectly 
binding: 𝐷𝑖 = 𝟙(𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑐).  
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Given the sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at 𝑐 under the assumptions 
outlined below then the local average treatment effect at cut-off 𝛽 =  𝔼[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 =
𝑐] can be identified. 
𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐] − lim
𝜀→0+
𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝜀] (4.1) 
= 𝔼[𝑌𝑖1|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐] − lim
𝜀→0+
𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝜀] (4.2) 
=  𝔼[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐] (4.3) 
The intuition is that the first term on the left-hand side of (4.2) is observed in the data 
when 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑐 and the second term of (4.2) is observed when 𝑋𝑖 < 𝑐. Therefore given 
that 𝜀 is sufficiently small 𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝜀] is an appropriate approximation for the 
unobservable 𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐]. 
Three assumptions underpin this interpretation. The first is the unconfoundedness or 
ignorability assumption: 𝑌𝑖0, 𝑌𝑖1 ⊥ 𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖. This condition is trivially satisfied since there 
is no variation in 𝐷𝑖 conditional on 𝑋𝑖. However, this does not mean that potential 
outcomes are guaranteed to be independent of treatment assignment. It is necessary to 
assume that pupils lack precise control over their aggregate maths test score. If pupils 
could precisely control the running variable, then pupils would self-select to either side 
of the cut-off value. Pupils who set their value of the running variable below the cut-off 
are likely to be systematically different to those who set their running variable value 
above the cut-off. Comparisons of outcomes for pupils either side of the cut-off would 
confound these systematic differences, meaning that the treatment effect is not 
identified by 𝔼[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐].  
Alternatively, suppose that pupils have imprecise control over the running variable. 
Correctly answering questions is not an unambiguously trivial exercise. Among those 
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with the ability, work ethic and other characteristics required to score near to the cut-
off, it comes down to idiosyncratic variation (or ‘chance’) as to whether they score 
above or below the cut-off. Pupils know that they need to score more marks to achieve 
level 4, but they do not know how many marks they need to score nor how the examiner 
will interpret their answers. This ambiguity is particularly true for the KS2 English 
SATs tests. The long-form writing task consists of one writing exercise and is worth 31 
per cent of the available English marks. There is considerable scope for variation in the 
marks awarded for this task between different markers. Given that pupils have imprecise 
control over their aggregate maths test score (𝑋𝑖) then level 4 (treatment) is “as good 
as” randomly assigned around the cut-off (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
However, I do not invoke the “as good as” random argument to claim identification. 
It is also necessary to assume that test markers are unable to exercise precise control 
over the running variable. Otherwise, if markers have a bias towards pupils with specific 
characteristics, then it would be possible that there are systematic differences in pupils 
either side of the cut-off. This assumption is not particularly onerous due to the features 
of the marking process. Firstly, the running variable is a function of the marks scored 
on three different maths tests marked by at least three different markers. Secondly, the 
only information markers have about pupils is their name and the name of their school. 
Thirdly, markers are subject to a moderation process. 
Schools can also request a review of pupils’ test scripts to ensure the original application 
of the mark scheme is appropriate and that no clerical errors have been made. Schools 
are more likely to request reviews when a pupil narrowly falls short of a grade threshold. 
As schools select into requesting reviews, grade feedback could become endogenous.  
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In 2009, less than 0.2 per cent of maths test scripts were reviewed. 52 per cent of these 
reviews resulted in the pupil receiving a different level. Less than 0.5 per cent of pupils 
received a different level following a successful review of their English test scripts 
(Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency, 2009). While it may appear that 
reviews are rare, and thus of limited concern, if these reviews are concentrated around 
level 4 and 5 grade thresholds then they represent a non-ignorable proportion of scripts 
in the region of grade thresholds.  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are histograms of the distributions of the 2009 English and maths 
KS2 SATs test marks. The vertical lines denote the thresholds for the level 4 and level 
5 grades. These histograms clearly indicate bunching to the right of the thresholds. As 
there is no other plausible explanation for the bunching of the distribution, these 
histograms indicate that a sizable number of pupils around the grade thresholds have 
benefited from successful reviews. This bunching does not necessarily invalidate the 
research design. However, we must further assume that schools’ decision to review 
scripts is exogenous. I argue this is likely since requesting a review is low cost: £6.50 
per script (refundable if the review is successful). This is likely to be affordable for even 
the most under resourced schools. Explicitly, it is necessary to assume that the decision 
to review a script is orthogonal to the determinants of the dependent variable. 
The second assumption is that the conditional expectation of the potential outcomes, 
𝔼[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖] and 𝔼[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖] are continuous at 𝑐. Without this assumption, it is impossible to 
distinguish between the local average treatment effect and any discontinuity in  
𝔼[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖] and 𝔼[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖] at the cut-off. In other words, I assume that the relationships 
between the outcome variable and its determinants are continuous at 𝑐. 
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The third assumption is that 𝜀 is sufficiently small such that 𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝜀] 
approximates 𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐] well. Since the support of 𝑋𝑖 is discrete rather than 
continuous, the limit of 𝜀 is one and not zero as presented above. That is, the closest 
approximation of  𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐] is 𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐 − 1] which will overstate the true 
𝔼[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐]. However, identification is achievable assuming that 
𝔼[𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗] = 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑗) (4.4) 
 
where 𝑗 denotes possible values of 𝑋𝑖, 𝑓(∙) is a continuous function, 𝐷𝑖𝑗= 𝟙(𝑋𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑐) 
and 𝑓(𝑐) =  𝔼[𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐]. This specification can be expressed as a regression model 
suitable for estimation on pupil-level data  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4.5) 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes pupil 𝑖’s GCSE maths attainment, 𝑥𝑖 is the distance between KS2 
SATs maths test mark and the threshold for the level 4 grade, and 𝜖𝑖 is the error term. 
OLS produces consistent estimates of equation (4.5) assuming that 𝑓(∙) is correctly 
specified. Following Lee and Card (2008), clustering standard errors by 𝑋𝑖 became 
common practice in the empirical literature. However, Kolesár and Rothe (2018) 
demonstrate that standard errors clustered by 𝑋𝑖 lead to confidence intervals with 
substantially worse coverage properties relative to conventional heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. As such, this chapter departs from the recent conventional 
wisdom and clusters standard errors at the primary school level. 
The analysis relies on an OLS estimator despite the popularisation of non-parametric 
methods for the estimation of 𝛽 by Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw (2001). Non-parametric 
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methods do not require the functional form assumptions implicit in parametric 
estimators. This is particularly advantageous for regression discontinuity designs since 
functional form mis-specification can generate bias in the 𝛽 estimator. Local linear 
regression estimators are preferred since they have been shown to have particularly 
good properties at the boundary of their support within the class of non-parametric 
estimators (Fan, 1992).  
However, given the discrete nature of the running variable, the asymptotic assumptions 
which justify non-parametric estimation will never hold (Lee and Card, 2008). 
Irrespective of the sample size, no observations of the running variable will fall within 
a small neighbourhood below the cut-off. In the limit, a one-sided non-parametric 
estimator will only place weight on observations satisfying 𝑐 − 1 < 𝑋𝑖 < 𝑐; but 𝑋𝑖 will 
not take on any value in this range. 
The choice of the functional form for 𝑓(∙) is crucial. 𝑓(∙) is modelled as a quadratic 
function. A hypothesis test based on a goodness-of-fit statistic calculated using the 
residual sum of squares form a cubic function (restricted model) and an unrestricted 
model of a full set of dummy variables for each value of 𝑋 indicates that a cubic 
functional form is too restrictive. 
The choice of bandwidth entails a variance bias trade-off. Variance reduces with a larger 
sample size (and thus bandwidth), but a larger bandwidth means 𝑓(∙) must fit a larger 
and more diverse set of observations, increasing the likelihood of misspecification. I 
adopt a bandwidth of ±15 marks around the threshold and show that the effect estimates 
are insensitive to smaller bandwidth choices (±5 marks and ±10 marks).   
An attractive quality of the data extract is the large sample size, which permits 
investigation of heterogeneous treatment effects. This chapter investigates whether the 
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effect of ‘just’ passing the mark cut-off to achieve level 4 in maths varies according to 
the pupil’s history of eligibility for free school meals (over the last six years), their 
gender and ethnicity. The heterogeneous analysis consists of splitting the sample into 
groups based on the characteristic of interest and estimating equation (4.5) on each 
subsample. 
4.6 Results 
Table 4.3 contains point estimates of the average treatment effect of marginally passing 
the raw mark thresholds for the level 4 and level 5 grades relative to narrowly falling 
short of the respective thresholds. These effects are referred to as the ‘level 4 (5) grade 
feedback effect’ throughout this section. The level 4 grade represents test performance 
at the expected standard and level 5 denotes performance above this standard. Column 
(1) features estimates of the English test level 4 grade feedback effect; Column (2) 
shows the English test level 5 grade feedback effect. Column (3) and Column (4) 
respectively show the maths test grade feedback effects for level 4 and level 5. Tables 
4.4 to 4.10 also follow this structure. The dependent variable in the first row is the 
standardised point score in either GCSE English or maths. In the second row, the 
dependent variable is the standardised point score of a pupil’s best eight GCSEs or 
equivalent qualifications (henceforth referred to as ‘best eight point score’). Absence, 
as measured by the number of sessions missed in the seventh grade, is the dependent 
variable in the final row. Each point estimate is from a different regression model. 
The estimate of the English level 4 grade feedback effect on GCSE English point score 
is an improvement of 0.01σ (henceforth σ denotes the sample standard deviation of the 
dependent variable). This point estimate is not statistically different from zero at 
conventional significance levels, nor is the estimate of the corresponding effect on best 
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eight point score; which is similar in magnitude (0.012σ). The maths level 4 grade 
feedback effect estimates are more consequential. The estimated effects on GCSE maths 
point score and best eight point score are improvements of 0.036σ and 0.032σ 
respectively. These point estimates respectively are statistically significant at the one 
per cent and five per cent levels. The point estimates of the English level 5 grade 
feedback effect are larger than the estimates of the maths level 5 grade feedback effect. 
The point estimate of the effect of narrowly passing the level 5 threshold on the English 
test on GCSE English point score is 0.02σ; twice the magnitude of the corresponding 
impact for maths. 
The grade feedback effect estimates on overall absence in the seventh-grade range from 
-0.222 to 0.057. These estimates are equivalent to missing one-tenth less of a school 
day to missing one-twentieth more school days. The standard errors are large relative 
to the point estimates meaning that none of the estimates are statistically non-zero. Thus, 
the table presents no evidence of grade feedback effects on school attendance for the 
average pupil. On the other hand, the table indicates that there is a moderate maths level 
4 grade feedback effect on subsequent attainment, and a slightly smaller English level 
5 grade feedback effect; yet there is no evidence of an English level 4 or maths level 5 
grade feedback effect. 
These small local average treatment effect estimates may mask substantial variation in 
the local average treatment effects for subgroups of the pupil population. Table 4.4 
shows grade feedback effect estimates for pupils with a history of FSM eligibility (Panel 
A), and those who have no FSM entitlement history (Panel B). The table indicates there 
are noticeable differences in the grade feedback effects between these groups. For 
illustrative purposes, Figures 4.3-4.6 graph the regression model used to estimate the 
grade feedback effects for FSM eligible pupils on GCSE English and maths point score. 
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The estimate of the English level 4 grade feedback effect on GCSE English point score 
is 0.029σ and is 0.037σ on best eight point score for FSM eligible pupils. For FSM 
ineligible pupils, the corresponding estimates respectively are 0.002σ and -0.001σ, and 
neither is statistically different from zero. The estimated English level 5 grade feedback 
effects for FSM eligible pupils are greater: 0.066σ on GCSE English point score, and 
0.045σ on best eight point score. Again, the corresponding point estimates for pupils 
without a history of FSM eligibility are statistically zero. Thus, English grade feedback 
effects on subsequent attainment are consequential for the most disadvantaged pupils, 
and seemingly non-existent for other pupils. 
The distinction between the maths test grade feedback effects for FSM eligible pupils 
and other pupils is less clear than the effects for English tests. The maths level 4 grade 
feedback effect estimates for FSM eligible pupils is sizable and positive (for example, 
0.054σ for GCSE maths point score). However, there are also positive – but 
substantially smaller – effects for non-eligible pupils (0.025σ on GCSE maths point 
score and 0.027σ on best eight point score). The effect estimates for non-eligible pupils 
are relatively less precise, and the difference in the point estimates between the two 
groups is not statistically significant at the five per cent level. The pattern of larger grade 
feedback effect estimates on subsequent attainment for FSM eligible pupils does not 
hold for the maths level 5 grade feedback effect. For FSM eligible pupils, the estimated 
maths level 5 grade feedback effects on attainment outcomes are not statistically 
different from zero, whereas for non-FSM eligible pupils the maths level 5 grade 
feedback effect estimate on GCSE maths point score is 0.011σ (but only statistically 
significant at the ten per cent level). The magnitude of this estimate is small relative to 
the English grade feedback effects for FSM eligible pupils. 
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The grade feedback effect estimates on absence for FSM non-eligible pupils are close 
to zero (-0.099 to 0.109) and statistically zero. For pupils with a history of FSM 
eligibility, the point estimates are all negative (ranging from -0.209 to -0.636) indicating 
that fewer school sessions are missed by pupils who marginally pass a level threshold. 
However, none of these estimates are statistically different from zero at the ten per cent 
level. 
The heterogeneity analysis continues in Table 4.5, which features separate grade 
feedback effect estimates for boys and girls. Panel A contains the estimates for boys, 
while Panel B contains the estimates for girls. Regarding English test levels, the grade 
feedback effect estimates for girls (on all dependent variables) are not statistically 
different from zero. However, for boys, there are modest positive English level 5 grade 
feedback effect estimates (0.33σ for GCSE English point score and 0.22σ for best eight 
point score). The English level 5 grade feedback effect on absence during the seventh 
grade is -0.420 for boys. These three coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 
least at the five per cent level. The English level 4 grade feedback effect estimates on 
future attainment are modest and positive for boys but are not statistically significant; 
for girls the corresponding estimates are precise zeros. 
Switching focus to the estimates of the maths level 4 grade feedback effects, we find 
the most substantial effect estimates within the table. For boys, the maths level 4 grade 
feedback effect is 0.038σ on GCSE maths point score and 0.040σ for best eight point 
score. These estimates are statistically significant at the five per cent level. For girls, 
the corresponding estimated effect on GCSE maths point score is smaller (0.030σ) 
although it is not statistically different from the boys’ estimate. The estimated impact 
on best eight point score is statistically zero for girls. Akin to the FSM heterogeneity 
results, the pattern in the results flips for the maths level 5 grade feedback effect 
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estimates. The estimated attainment maths level 5 grade feedback effect is statistically 
zero for boys. However, for girls, there is a small positive estimated effect. 
Table 4.6 contains the final heterogeneous effects results. Panel A contains effect 
estimates for white pupils, whereas Panel B contains estimates for non-white pupils. 
For white pupils, three of the four coefficient estimates of the grade feedback effect on 
GCSE point score are precise and statistically non-zero. The English level 5 and maths 
level 4 grade feedback effects are largest (0.026σ and 0.036σ respectively), while the 
English level 4 and maths level 5 grade feedback effects are relatively smaller 
(respectively 0.016σ and 0.015σ). For white pupils, the estimated effects on best eight 
point score are similar to the corresponding estimates on GCSE point score in English 
or maths.  However, the former set of estimates are less precise meaning that only the 
larger estimated effects (English level 5 and maths level 4) are statistically non-zero at 
conventional significance levels.  
For non-white pupils, the point estimates for the attainment models are generally much 
closer to zero than the corresponding estimates for white pupils; none are statistically 
different from zero. Regarding the effect on absence estimates, the estimates for non-
white pupils are not statistically different from zero. For white pupils, the estimated 
math level 5 grade feedback effect on absence is -0.239 and is the only statistically non-
zero absence estimate at the ten per cent significance level. 
Attention now turns towards judging the robustness of the results presented above. 
Table 4.7 investigates whether any discontinuities exist in predetermined pupil 
characteristics at the level 4 and 5 grade thresholds for both the English and maths KS2 
SATs tests. The predetermined pupil characteristics are four binary variables indicating 
independently whether a pupil is female, has a history of FSM eligibility, is white and 
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is a native English speaker. The fifth pupil characteristic is the standardised average 
point score of a pupil’s KS1 (age seven) teacher assessments. This latter characteristic 
is the only measure of attainment available before the KS2 SATs tests. None of the 
coefficient estimates presented in the table are statistically different from zero at the 
five per cent significance level. Only two coefficient estimates (the ‘effect’ of 
marginally crossing the level 4 threshold in English on speaking English as a first 
language and on KS1 average teacher assessments) are statistically non-zero at the ten 
per cent significance level. The table fails to provide evidence of discontinuities in the 
observable predetermined characteristics at the level 4 and 5 grade thresholds. While 
this does not guarantee that there are no discontinuities in unobservable attributes at the 
level thresholds, it does not undermine the assumptions underpinning the identification 
strategy. 
Table 4.8 explores the sensitivity of the results from the full sample of pupils to the 
inclusion of predetermined pupil characteristics in the regression models. If the 
coefficient estimates substantially differ between the models with and without controls, 
then this undermines the results presented thus far. A difference in the coefficient 
estimates would indicate that the estimated effect of marginally passing the level 
thresholds is at least partly due to differences in the observable characteristics on either 
side of the threshold. Adding the control variables removes any bias in the treatment 
effect estimate caused by differences in observable characteristics on either side of the 
thresholds. Each panel presents estimates from models with and without pupil 
characteristics. In columns (2) to (4), the difference in estimates between the models 
with and without controls is trivial. In Column (1) the estimated effect of just meeting 
the level 4 threshold for English doubles in magnitude in Panels A and B, however, this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.9 appraises the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to the choice of the 
bandwidth used in the regression modelling. In the principal analysis, a bandwidth of 
±15 marks around the level thresholds is used. The table contains results using 
alternative bandwidths of ±5 marks, ±10 marks and ±20 marks. Panel A features models 
in which the dependent variable is the GCSE point score in English and maths. Aside 
from column (3) in which coefficient estimates range from 0.048 to 0.027, the estimates 
do not meaningfully differ as the bandwidth varies. In Panel B, the dependent variable 
is the best eight point score. There is limited variation in the point estimates when the 
bandwidth is either ±5 marks, ±10 marks or ±15 marks. Finally, in Panel C, which 
considers absence in the seventh grade, the coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant at conventional significance levels irrespective of the bandwidth in columns 
(1) through (4). Overall, the interpretation of the primary results would not be 
substantially different if they were based on one of the alternative bandwidths. 
Table 4.10 considers whether discontinuities in the dependent variable exist at other 
points in the raw test mark distribution. The table replicates the regression models but 
shifts the level thresholds between two marks below and two marks above the actual 
thresholds. If evidence exists of other discontinuities in the region near the level 
thresholds, then this would severely impair the validity of the main results. In panels A 
and B (models for GCSE point score in English/maths and best eight point score), the 
point estimates of discontinuities at the false level thresholds are generally close to zero. 
The point estimates of the effects of marginally passing the ‘fake’ maths level 4 
thresholds are modest, but like all but one coefficient estimates in panels A and B, they 
are not statistically different from zero at the ten per cent significance level. In Panel C, 
only one coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the ten per cent level. 
Thus, the table suggests that discontinuities in the outcome variables are not present at 
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arbitrary points in the neighbourhood of the level thresholds; this further strengthens 
the causal interpretation given to the results discussed earlier. 
4.7 Discussion 
Grade based feedback from an ostensibly low-stakes series of standardised tests taken 
at age eleven has a polarising effect on the secondary school qualification grades of 
otherwise similar pupils. The polarisation appears to be stronger for economically 
disadvantaged pupils, and – in the case of English grades – non-existent for other pupils.  
The core function of the KS2 SATs tests is to measure primary school performance. 
The KS2 SATs tests do not provide the basis for the awarding of qualifications. As such, 
it is undesirable that the coarse feedback pupils receive from their participation impacts 
their subsequent progress. Pupils need not receive any feedback for the tests to serve 
their use as a primary school performance metric.  
This chapter, therefore, highlights that when test-based school accountability systems 
are being designed, it is essential to consider the nature of feedback provided to 
participating pupils. It also suggests that it is necessary to understand how the feedback 
might interact with the institutional features of the schooling system. For example, the 
potential for the feedback to be used to set class groups or to fix subsequent attainment 
targets. Since this chapter shows that feedback from the KS2 SATs tests generates 
differences in progress between comparable pupils, it is arguable that a review of both 
the feedback mechanism and the uses of the feedback would be prudent. 
Such a review has taken place. Following the introduction of the new national 
curriculum for England in 2014, the DfE reformed the SATs test feedback mechanism 
for pupils in 2016. The department replaced the broad national curriculum levels studied 
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in this chapter with scaled scores. Scaled scores represent a less coarse feedback 
mechanism, while still being anchored to attainment standards and suitable for 
comparisons across cohorts.  
Instead of receiving a level ranging from two to five, pupils receive a scaled score that 
ranges from 80 to 120. A scaled score of 100 denotes achieving the expected standard 
precisely, while a score above or below 100 represents attainment above or below the 
expected standard respectively. This granular approach to feedback ensures that pupils 
who are working just below the expected standard have a sense of perspective to their 
apparent underachievement. Under the previous national curriculum levels mechanism, 
pupils are unaware of the extent of their apparent distance to the expected standard. 
Pupils who are very far from the expected standard no longer receive the same feedback 
as those very close (but not close enough) to the expected standard. 
Also, in 2016, the DfE replaced expected progress as the headline measure of pupil 
progress at secondary school with a simple value-added metric, progress eight. A 
school’s progress eight score is the simple average of the difference between its pupils’ 
total point score from GCSE English and maths plus six other subjects and the national 
average total point score of pupils with the same KS2 SATs performance. The 
introduction of progress eight means that GCSE English and maths targets are no longer 
monotonically increasing step functions of KS2 SATs test attainment (with ‘jumps’ 
corresponding to each level threshold). As such, the pupil progress metric no longer 
incentivises schools to exert effort disproportionately on pupils who score ‘just’ above 
each level thresholds relative to those ‘just’ below each level threshold. 
There are other potential reforms of the feedback mechanism. Alcott (2017) 
characterises them on a spectrum ranging from extreme measures to mild. The extreme 
144 
 
reform would be to discontinue KS2 SATs test in their entirety, and by implication 
discontinuing feedback from the tests. However, if school-level KS2 SATs test 
performance is a useful indicator of school quality for parents and regulators, then this 
information would be lost. 
Alternatively, if the mechanism linking grade feedback to subsequent attainment were 
autogenous to pupils, then it would be wise not to inform pupils of their test 
performance. For example, if grade feedback affects pupils’ motivation and effort and 
this is the cause of the polarisation in subsequent attainment, then pupil motivation will 
be uninfluenced by their performance substantially if they are unaware of their results. 
If grade feedback affects effort and motivation, then one might expect to see an effect 
of grade feedback on school attendance. However, there is no evidence of substantial 
effects on school attendance. 
Supposing that the mechanism is institutional, such as through class or target setting, 
then a wise suggestion would be to anonymise feedback from the tests fully. Teachers 
and school leaders would not be able to use the test feedback for class or target setting, 
but they would be able to use alternative, and possibly better suited, data for these 
purposes. 
A moderate approach is to provide feedback on a continuous scale, as is now the case 
in England. This might complicate the interpretation of scores for both parents and 
pupils, but the benefits of moving away from broad grades are likely to outweigh this 
cost (Alcott, 2017).  The mildest reform would be to strive to moderate the interpretation 
of test feedback by parents and pupils. If the source of the grade feedback effect is 
parents or pupils, then policymakers should encourage parents and pupils to view 
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schooling attainment as malleable, and not consider test feedback as a decisive and 
irreversible determination of ability. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to quantify the causal effect of marginally passing grade 
thresholds on standardised tests, attempted at age eleven, on subsequent school 
attendance as well as attainment at the end of compulsory schooling. To this end, the 
analysis exploits the assignment of grades to pupils on the sole basis of the raw test 
scores achieved on the standardised tests with the availability of a rich administrative 
dataset to estimate a series of models based on a sharp regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) identification strategy. 
The chapter finds evidence that the grades awarded on the supposedly low stakes 
standardised tests affect future secondary school qualification grades, but no evidence 
of an impact on attendance during the school year after the pupils sit the test. For the 
average pupil, just meeting the raw mark threshold for the grade denoting achievement 
above the expected standard in English at age eleven increases English grades by two 
per cent of a standard deviation five years later at the end of schooling. In maths, the 
average effect of narrowly passing the cut-off for grade denoting meeting the expected 
standard improves the end of school maths grade by 3.6 per cent of a standard deviation.   
However, these small average treatment effects mask substantial heterogeneity. English 
language standardised test grades do not influence subsequent English attainment for 
pupils who have never had an entitlement to free school meals. On the other hand, ‘just’ 
achieving the expected standard in English boosts free school meal eligible pupils’ end 
of schooling English grades by three per cent of a standard deviation. While marginally 
reaching the raw mark threshold for the above-expected standard grade boosts 
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subsequent English grades by 6.6 per cent of a standard deviation for the same group. 
The findings indicate that it would be wise of policymakers to consider the nature of 
the feedback provided by standardised tests as well as the usage of said feedback when 
designing a test-based accountability system. Policymakers in England designed SATs 
tests to be low stakes from the pupil perspective, yet this chapter demonstrates how 
SATs test grades affect performance on terminal school exams independent of pupils’ 
underlying ability. In addition, the findings of this chapter raise new questions about 
the differences in school experience between disadvantaged and advantaged pupils. It 
is undoubtedly troubling that pupils who narrowly miss achieving a grade due to bad 




Figure 4.1 Histogram of 2009 KS2 English SAT test raw marks 
 










Figure 4.2 Histogram of 2009 KS2 maths SAT test raw marks 
 





Figure 4.3 Effect of marginally passing the English level 4 grade threshold on GCSE 
English point score (standardised) for FSM eligible pupils 
 
Notes: filled circles represent cell means of GCSE English point score (standardised). See Panel A 
of Table 4.4 for details of the estimated discontinuity. 
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Figure 4.4 Effect of marginally passing the English level 5 grade threshold on GCSE 
English point score (standardised) for FSM eligible pupils 
 
Notes: filled circles represent cell means of GCSE English point score (standardised). See Panel A 




Figure 4.5 Effect of marginally passing the maths level 4 grade threshold on GCSE 
maths point score (standardised) for FSM eligible pupils 
 
Notes: filled circles represent cell means of GCSE maths point score (standardised). See Panel A 




Figure 4.6 Effect of marginally passing the maths level 5 grade threshold on GCSE 
maths point score (standardised) for FSM eligible pupils 
 
Notes: filled circles represent cell means of GCSE maths point score (standardised). See Panel A 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis evaluates how outcomes for pupils in England's state schools are shaped by 
the ways schools are organised and held to account for their performance. Each research 
chapter combines a rich administrative dataset – the National Pupil Database (NPD) – 
with transparent, justified and well-established policy evaluation methods.  
Chapter two considers the effect of increasing the autonomy of primary schools – via 
the academies programme – on pupils’ attainment during and at the end of primary 
school, as well as on the entry-year intake of primary schools. Chapter three investigates 
the impact on individual pupils of not participating in standardised tests at primary 
schools, while other pupils continue to sit the standardised tests, on subsequent 
attainment throughout their schooling. Finally, chapter four examines how the feedback 
each pupil receives based on their performance in the same series of standardised tests 
affects their subsequent schooling attainment and attendance. 
5.1 Summary of Chapter Two 
The first academy schools opened in September 2002 and replaced persistently under-
performing secondary schools in deprived neighbourhoods. Research has shown that 
replacing these schools with academies led to an improvement in pupils’ attainment 
during and beyond schooling. In 2010, the government offered all ‘well-performing’ 
schools the right to convert to academy status. Academies quickly came to dominate 
the secondary school sector and around one-quarter of primary schools became 
academies. However, the rapid rise of the academy model occurred with a limited 
understanding of whether the model would be effective in schools that were not failing 
secondary schools. 
Chapter two is among the first attempts to evaluate how attainment is affected when 
primary schools with a track record of good performance transition to the academy 
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model. The chapter uses a difference-in-differences strategy exploiting the availability 
of a panel of pupil attainment data. The strategy uses differences in the timing of 
primary schools’ transitions to academy status to define treatment and control groups. 
Schools in both groups have a desire to become academies, but some schools (the 
treatment group) become academies early on while others (the control group) take 
longer to switch. Baseline covariates are not statistically different between the two 
groups which also share a common time trend in the pre-treatment period; this provides 
suggestive evidence that the identifying assumptions hold. 
The results of the difference-in-differences models are consistent with each other. There 
is no evidence of an effect of academy conversion on attainment in either reading or 
maths, during or at the end of primary school for the average pupil. However, there is 
evidence that the attainment of pupils eligible for free school meals does slightly 
improve. 
The academies programme is not inexpensive. As such, the fact that pupil attainment 
on average neither improves nor deteriorates because of a primary school’s transition 
to the academy model does not indicate that the policy is not harmful. The policy is 
harmful because of the opportunity costs associated with the policy’s facilitation; 
resources could have been otherwise spent on policy reforms which have been shown 
to be effective. 
There remain several unanswered questions about the effectiveness of the academy 
programme. The impact on attainment in historically under-performing secondary 
schools of the transition to academy status is the focus of many papers, however, there 
is comparatively little academic research on the attainment impacts on historically 
under-performing primary schools as well as well-performing secondary schools. 
168 
 
Further research on these two contexts may shed light on why academy status does not 
affect attainment in well-performing primary schools but does affect attainment in 
challenged secondaries. 
5.2  Summary of Chapter Three 
Pupils in England’s primary schools have had to sit standardised tests at the end of their 
primary schooling since the mid-1990s. While the principal purpose of these tests is to 
provide data to track primary school performance, the tests also serve a formative 
function. That is, the tests are intended to provide insightful feedback to parents and 
teachers and thus aid pupils’ progress. 
However, there is considerable concern that standardised testing is harmful for pupils’ 
learning. Standardised testing incentives schools to teach to the test, ignoring untested 
subject matter while overly focusing on test taking skills. As standardised tests are often 
introduced (and discontinued) across an entire population of school children and in 
tandem with school accountability reforms, there is rarely an opportunity to empirically 
test the effect of participation in standardised tests on subsequent schooling attainment. 
A 2010 boycott of KS2 SATs tests, sat by eleven-year olds throughout England, forms 
the basis of a natural experiment that chapter three exploits. As the boycott had partial 
coverage (26 per cent of schools participated in the boycott) and since data on pupil 
attainment is available for numerous cohorts, chapter three again employees a 
difference-in-differences strategy. Propensity score matching is used to identify non-
boycotting primary schools that are similar in observable characteristics to boycotting 
primary schools. Baseline covariates are not statistically different between the schools 
that boycotted and the matched control group. They also share a common cohort trend 
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across cohorts preceding the boycott affected cohort; this provides suggestive evidence 
that the identifying assumptions hold. 
As the boycott was officially called only a matter of school days prior to the tests being 
due to take place, the chapter presents an argument (supported by primary survey data) 
that the treatment effect of the boycott reflects non-participation in the test only. In other 
words, the boycott did not affect how pupils prepared for the tests. 
The results of the difference-in-differences models indicate that pupils affected by the 
boycott received inflated contemporaneous teacher assessments in English and maths. 
However, teacher assessment attainment three years after the boycott as well as 
secondary school qualification attainment are both slightly adversely impacted by 
boycott participation for the average pupil. Further analysis also reveals that the subject 
choice of pupils was affected by the boycott as pupils became less likely to choose an 
“academic” set of subjects in their final two years of schooling. Boycott affected pupils 
also missed marginally fewer secondary school lessons.  
However, the chapter also presents a collection of difference-in-differences models that 
accommodate heterogeneity in the treatment effect. The effect of boycott participation 
on attainment is quite diverse depending on the characteristics of the pupil affected with 
some sub-groups of pupils estimated to have benefited from participation in the boycott. 
The chapter concludes by providing speculation as to the nature of the mechanism. The 
link between boycott participation and secondary school qualification grade targets is 
identified. Pupils who were affected by the boycott had artificially high secondary 
school qualification grade targets. As the proportion of pupils meeting these grade 
targets was published in school league tables, secondary schools are keen to maximise 
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their rate of success at meeting the targets. This may mean that schools are incentivised 
to switch attention from boycott affected pupils to non-affected pupils. 
5.3 Summary of Chapter Four 
As referred to in the previous section, in England’s primary schools, pupils are provided 
with feedback on their performance in standardised tests that are sat at the end of 
primary school. The purpose of this feedback is to aid pupils’ subsequent learning. 
However, the feedback is relatively coarse, taking the form of integer grades ranging 
from 2 to 6. The integer grades are linked to descriptors of attainment: levels 2 and 3 
denote attainment below the nationally expected standard for eleven-year olds, level 4 
denotes attainment at the expected standard, while level 5 denotes attainment beyond 
the expected level.  
The allocation of grades to pupils is based exclusively on test mark thresholds. The 
government’s advice to schools is that pupils should not be informed of their raw mark 
score on the test. The implication of this guidance is that, in the immediate region of the 
thresholds, two pupils who score almost identical marks can be given substantially 
different feedback and remain unaware of how close they came to be receiving the 
others’ feedback. 
The result is that idiosyncratic circumstances such as minor arithmetic errors, 
misreading questions or other misfortune can determine whether a pupil is told that their 
entire attainment in English or maths throughout primary school is below, at or above 
a level deemed to be satisfactory for their age. Chapter four evaluates whether “just” 
crossing the raw mark thresholds to achieve the level 4 and level 5 grades influences 
secondary school qualification attainment five years later. 
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The assignment of grades to pupils based on a test score means that the treatment effect 
of grades is well suited to estimation using sharp regression discontinuity models. The 
results of the regression discontinuity models indicate that grades on age eleven 
standardised tests have a polarising effect on attainment in important secondary school 
qualifications. That is, a pupil who narrowly crosses the threshold required to achieve 
the level 4 or level 5 grade will on average perform marginally better in their 
qualifications than if they had just fallen short of passing the threshold. 
Heterogeneous treatment effect analysis reveals that, particularly in the case of the 
English standardised test, that the effect of grades on subsequent attainment are more 
substantial for pupils with a history of free school meal eligibility than pupils with no 
history of eligibility. Therefore, chapter four indicates one small avenue by which 
socioeconomic disadvantage translates into reduced attainment at school. The chapter 
also considers whether grades affect attendance in the first year of secondary school; no 
evidence of an effect is uncovered by the regression discontinuity models. 
5.4  Limitations of the Thesis 
Each research chapter uses data from the NPD. As an administrative dataset covering 
the entire population of English state funded schools and their pupils, researchers have 
little reason to be concerned about the accuracy of the NPD data or whether it is a 
representative sample of the population.  
However, the NPD records a limited collection of pupil characteristics compared to 
survey datasets. For example, the NPD does not contain any information on the 
characteristics of parents, or the circumstances of a pupil’s household. These 
characteristics are important determinants of educational attainment, and therefore it 
would be advantageous to include them as control variables in the analysis. At the very 
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least including a richer set of control variables will reduce the variance of the error term 
in the regression models which would subsequently reduce the standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates, thus narrowing confidence intervals. More importantly, 
controlling for a wider range of determinants reduces the potential for omitted variable 
bias. 
A second issue with the NPD dataset is the precision of the measure of attainment at the 
end of secondary school; the principal outcome of interest in chapters three and four. 
The NPD records letter grades achieved in GCSE qualifications. This is a relatively 
broad measure of attainment and limits the amount of variation in attainment that can 
be observed. A more granular measure of attainment will mean finer variation in 
attainment can be detected. A similar issue is variation in the way that attainment in 
GCSEs and equivalent qualifications are recorded in the dataset. Depending on the 
cohort and subject in question, the NPD either records a pupil’s best GCSE grade for 
that subject or the grade of their first exam entry for that subject. However, the inclusion 
of cohort fixed effects absorbs this inconsistency. 
Secondary school qualifications are often a means to an end. Many pupils complete 
some form of further education, and therefore only rely on such qualifications to gain 
access to further education courses. For this reason, there is considerable value in 
investigating post-secondary school attainment outcomes as part of chapters three and 
four. The NPD does not contain complete further education data, but it can be found in 
the Individualised Learner Record (ILR) dataset. The ILR and NPD datasets can be 
matched at the pupil level, however, it was not possible to access ILR data as part of 
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